JUDGMENT :

Manjari Nehru Kaul, J.

The present revision petition has been filed challenging the order dated 18.03.2025 passed by learned Judge, Special Court, Ludhiana, in FIR No.41 dated 09.03.2023 under Sections 22 and 29 of The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'NDPS Act'), registered at Police Station Sadar, District Ludhiana, whereby the application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. filed by the prosecution for summoning and examining three prosecution witnesses namely, ASI John Peter, Head Constable Gurvinder Singh, and Lakhvinder Singh has been allowed.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned order suffers from serious legal infirmities. It is argued that the application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. was moved at a highly belated stage, thereby causing grave prejudice to the petitioner. It has been further contended that the learned trial Court has failed to adhere to the well-settled legal principles governing the invocation of Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., and that allowing the prosecution to examine these witnesses at this stage would amount to granting an undue advantage, enabling it to fill lacunae in its case. Additionally, learned counsel submits that the learned trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the said application as it was an attempt to introduce evidence that the prosecution had consciously omitted to produce earlier.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material on record.

4. The power under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is intended to ensure a just adjudication by allowing the Court to summon any witness whose evidence is essential for arriving at a proper and just conclusion. A perusal of the impugned order does not reflect any perversity or illegality; rather it has been passed in the interest of justice, and the petitioner would have a full opportunity to cross-examine the summoned witnesses, thereby eliminating any question of prejudice.

5. It is also imperative to point out that Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C./438(2) of the BNSS imposes a statutory bar on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in relation to interlocutory orders. The settled position in law is that an order allowing or rejecting an application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C./348 of the BNSS, for summoning or recalling a witness is purely interlocutory in nature, as it does not determine the rights of the parties in a final or conclusive manner. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Sethuraman Versus Rajamanickam 2010 (5) RCR (Criminal) 512, has unequivocally held that an order permitting the recall or summoning of a witness under 311 of the Cr.P.C. is interlocutory in nature and, therefore, not amenable to revision under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

'4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2)Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorre