JUDGMENT :

SUMEET GOEL, J.

CRM-13183-2019

1. The present application has been filed on behalf of the applicant-petitioner seeking condonation of delay of 109 days in filing the accompanying revision petition. The main revision petition has been filed impugning the judgment dated 15.09.2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala dismissing the appeal preferred by the State of Punjab, acquitting the respondent No.2 from the charges. The applicant-petitioner, by way of instant revision petition, impugns the abovesaid judgment.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant-petitioner, while seeking grant of prayer for condonation of delay of 109 days, has argued that the applicant-petitioner had applied for the certified copies of the impugned judgment well within the prescribed period. However, due to an inadvertent and bona fide error, the trial court record was misplaced, which resulted in the delay in filing the present revision petition. The delay was neither intentional nor deliberate. The applicant–petitioner has now been able to reconstruct the trial court record, and consequently, the present revision petition has been filed without any further delay. It has been further contended that no prejudice is going to be caused to the respondents in case the instant application is allowed and the instant revision petition is heard on merits. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner has further argued that the circumstances of the case indicate that the delay in filing the revision petition is neither intentional nor deliberate & hence delay deserves to be condoned.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner and have perused the paper-book.

4. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of this Court passed in CRR No. 1844-2023 titled as Deepak vs. Noori and another, decided on 29.02.2024; relevant whereof reads as under:-

“8. As a sequel to above-said discussion, the following principles of law emerge:

I. A liberal approach, undoubtedly, ought to be accorded to a plea for condonation of delay made under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 so as to further the cause of substantial justice. The concept of substantial justice essentially includes in itself the desirability of adjudication of a claim of the litigant on merits thereof rather than rejection of the same, at the threshold, on account of being barred by limitation. However, adoption of such liberal approach cannot be stretched to mean that a prayer (for condonation of delay) ought to be granted sans reasonable explanation therefor. An applicant (seeking condonation of delay) has to bring forward cogent, credible and lucid reason(s) to substantiate such a plea. In case such reason(s) is not scrutable, a Court would well be within its discretion to decline such plea (for condonation of delay). In other words, inexplicable delay ought not to be condoned.

II. A Court ought to grant an application seeking condonation of delay when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to such applicant and/or such delay has occurred on account of circumstances beyond reasonable control of such applicant.

III. It is not the length of delay (sought to be condoned) but explanation thereof which is relevant for consideration by a Court.

IV. Law of limitation does not require an applicant (seeking condonation of delay) to furnish an exhaustive explanation on ‘day to-day basis’ for such delay. A Court while dealing with a plea for condonation of delay need not undertake such a pedantic approach.

V. In appropriate cases, a Court may consider imposing costs while granting an application for condonation of delay. However, the quantification of costs so imposed, must reflect the same being commensurate to the lis in issue as also attending circumstances therein.

VI. The factum; of non-applicant(s) or even strangers having altered their position(s) relying upon the applicant not having filed an appeal/revision etc. within stipulated time an