1961 Supreme(All) 114
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
A. P. Srivastava and B. Dayal, JJ.
SANT RAM - Appellant
Versus
LABH SINGH - Respondents
Second Appeal 620 Of 1957
Decided On : 08/28/1961
AMBIKA PRASAD, GANESH PRASAD, IQBAL AHMED
Headnote:
PRE-EMPTION - CONSTITUTIONALITY - ARTICLE 19 (1) (F) AND ARTICLE 13 - MOHAMMADAN LAW - CUSTOMARY LAW - REASONABLENESS - INTEREST OF GENERAL PUBLIC - VALIDITY.
Fact of the Case:
Two second appeals arising out of two pre-emption cases. In one case, the plaintiff claimed a right of pre-emption on the ground that there was a custom of pre-emption prevalent in the town of Milak in accordance with which he, being a Shafi-e-jar was entitled to have the two houses in preference to the appellants. In the other case, the plaintiff sought to pre-empt the sale on the ground that a custom of pre-emption was prevalent in the town of Varanasi, and he claimed to be a Shafi-e-jar as well as a Shafi-e-Khalit.
Finding of the Court:
1. The existence of the custom of pre-emption relied upon was denied. 2. The performance of the necessary Talabs was disputed. 3. It was pleaded that the plaintiff could not claim a right of pre-emption because a strip of land measuring three feet and six inches separating the plaintiff's house from the property sold had not been sold and was still being retained by the vendor. 4. The law of pre-emption under which the plaintiff claimed, had become void after coming into force of the Constitution.
Issues: 1. Whether after coming into operation of the Constitution, the right of pre-emption is contrary to the provisions of Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 13 of the Constitution, or is it saved by clause (5) of Article 19? 2. Whether the entire law of pre-emption under the Mohammadan Law became void under article 13 of the Constitution, as It imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of acquiring and holding property guaranteed under the Constitution?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The right of pre-emption is a restriction on the right to acquire and hold property, but it is a reasonable restriction and is in the interest of the general public. 2. The law of pre-emption, including the provision conferring a right to pre-empt on a shafi-e-jar, continues to be valid even after the coming into force of the constitution.
Final Decision: 1. Both the appeals are dismissed. 2. The answer to the question referred to us in Second Appeal No. 620 of 1957 is that the right of pre-emption based on the ground of vicinage is saved by Clause (5) of Article 19 and has therefore not become void under Article 13 of the Constitution.
( 1 ) THESE are two second appeals arising out of two pre-emption cases. It will be convenient to deal with them together because they involve a common, question of law.
( 2 ) S. A. No. 620 of 1957 is a defendants appeal. Srimati Kesri Begum, the second respondent in that appeal owned two houses in the town of Milak in the district of Rampur. By a sale-deed dated 4th of December, 1953, she sold the two houses to the appellant. The respondent no. 1 Sri labh Singh owned a house adjacent to the houses sold. He sought to pre-empt the sale on. the ground that there was a custom of pre-emption prevalent in the town of Milak in accordance with which he, being a Shafi-e-jar was entitled to have the two houses in preference to the appellants. He, therefore, claimed the two houses in enforcement of his right of pre-emption. The suit was contested on various grounds. The existence of the custom of pre-emption relied upon was denied. The performance of the necessary Talabs was disputed and it was also pleaded that the plaintiff could not claim a right of pre-emption because a strip of land measuring three feet and six inches separating the plaintiffs house from the property sold had not been sold and was still being retained by the vendor. The other pleas raised were repelled but the last mentioned plea was accepted by the trial Court which on that ground dismissed the suit. The plaintiff questioned the decision of the trial Court in appeal. The lower appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court on the other question involved tut did not agree, about the loss of the plaintiffs right of preemption on the ground that a strip of land immediately adjacent to his house had not been sold. The learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that the device adopted to defeat the plaintiffs right was a fraudulent, imperfect and insufficient one. It was argued before the learned Civil Judge that on the coming into force of the Constitution, the law of pre-emption under which the plaintiff claimed, had become void but the plea was not accepted. The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the plaintiffs suit was decreed. The vendee then filed a second appeal in this Court and among the questions which were raised on his behalf in this Court was the question, relating to the constitutionality of the law in question after coming into force of the Constitution. Mr. Justice V. D. Bhargava before whom the appeal came up for disposal was of opinion that authorities on the point were conflicting and that the question was one which deserved consideration by a Division Bench. He, therefore, framed the following question and referred it to a Division Bench for consideration : "whether after coming into operation of the Constitution, the right of pre-emption is contrary to the provisions of Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 13 of the Constitution, or is it saved by clause (5) of Article 19 ?
( 3 ) IN the other Second Appeal No. 2656. of 1959, Irshad Ahmad and Iqbal Ahmad sold a house situated in the town of Varanasi by a sale-deed dated 4th of June, 1954, in favour of Srimati karam Ilahi. Alleging that a custom of pre-emption was prevalent in the town of Varanasi, ikhtiar. Ahmad sought to pre-empt the sale. He questioned the correctness of the consideration entered in the sale-deed and claimed to have performed the necessary Talabs. The suit was contested on various grounds. It was pleaded that he had no right of pre-emption, that he had not performed the Talabs that the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence and that the consideration entered in the sale deed was the real consideration.
( 4 ) IN the trial Court, the plaintiff claimed to be a Shafi-e-jar as well as a Shafi-e-Khalit. He alleged that his house was situated just adjacent to the house in dispute on the north. He also alleged that he shared in the amenities and appendages of the house sold inasmuch as the water of his house and the water of the house, in dispute flowed through