Hon’ble Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the impugned Notification dated 15.6.2006, issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) and Declaration dated 19.10.2006, issued under Section 6 of the Act, and further direction is sought to release the land in question which is covered by residential area.

2. The validity of the acquisition proceedings cannot be examined as the petitioner has challenged it at a belated stage, and it is admitted to the petitioner himself that by invoking the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the Act the possession of the land has already been taken on 10.8.2007. Had the petitioner been diligent enough and was willing to challenge the acquisition proceedings, he should have approached the Court within reasonable time. (Vide Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar, (1980) 2 SCC 83; H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 866; Hari Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1984 SC 1020; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1414; The Ramjas Foundation and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1993 SC 852; Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991; State of Orissa v. Dhobei Sethi and another, (1995) 5 SCC 583; C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 SCC 627; and Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and others, (2003) 1 SCC 335).

3. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor, Delhi and others, AIR 1974 SC 2077, has observed as under :

......to have sat in fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on the grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published, would be putting a premium of dilatory tactics. The wit petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner.”

4. Same view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. V. K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190, wherein it was observed that respondent was not entitled to challenge the validity of Section 4 Notification after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice, as required by Section 4 of the Act, was not given and that would per se vitiate the notification under Section 4, the person interested should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.

5. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. (Pvt) Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 482, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under :

“If the interested person allows the grass to grow under his feet by allowing the acquisition proceedings to go on and reach its terminus in the award and possession is taken in furtherance thereof and vest in the State free from all incumbrances, the slumbered interested person would be told off the gates of the Court that his grievance should not be entertained when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4 (1) and Declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not exercise its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference.”

6. Thus, at such a belated stage, the validity of Section 4 Notification and Section 6 Declaration cannot be examined and petition i