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1970 Supreme(All) 1

Allahbad High Court
S.N.DWIVEDI,S.N.SINGH,HARISWARUP
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow - Appellant
Versus
Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur - Respondent
Decided On : 01/01/1970

Advocates:
Standing Counsel, for Applicant; Raja Ram Agarwala, for Opposite Party.

Headnote:

LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 14 - APPLICABILITY - REVISION UNDER SALES TAX ACT - PERIOD OF LIMITATION - COMPUTATION - PRINCIPLE OF SECTION 14 - APPLICABILITY - TRIBUNAL NOT A COURT - PRINCIPLE OF SECTION 14 NOT APPLICABLE.

Fact of the Case:

The respondent, M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, carries on business at Kanpur. The Sales Tax Officer assessed sales tax for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 on the respondent. Two separate orders were made. There were two appeals by the respondent. On the date of the hearing of the appeals the respondent was absent. So the appeals were dismissed in default on May 10, 1963. The appeals were dismissed in default by virtue of Rule 68(5) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules. Rule 68(5) allowed dismissal of appeals in default. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 68 provided for setting aside the dismissal in default and for the readmission of the appeal. In accordance with sub-rule (6), the respondent made two applications for setting aside the dismissal in default and for re-admission of the appeals. While these applications were pending, Sri Justice Manchanda held in a case that sub-rule (5) of Rule 68 was ultra vires the rule making authority and that the appellate authority could not dismiss an appeal in default. He held that the appeal should be decided on merits even though the appellant be absent. When the applications came up for hearing on October 10, 1964, the appellate authority dismissed them outright in view of the decision of Sri Justice Manchanda. Then the respondent filed two revisions under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 prescribes a period of limitation for filing a revision. The maximum period of limitation is one year and six months. But the revisions were filed beyond this maximum period. The Judge (Revisions) gave the benefit of Section 14 Limitation Act and excluded the period during which the respondent had been prosecuting the applications for readmission of the appeals. He found, as he should have, that the action of the respondent was bona fide. Excluding the period, he held that the revisions were filed within time. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, then asked the Judge (Revisions) to make a reference to this Court under Sec. 11(1). These are all the essential facts for our purpose.

Finding of the Court:

The Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax has, no doubt, some of the trappings of a Court but it cannot be regarded as a Court exercising judicial power of the State. It is a special Tribunal created for a special purpose and that purpose is only to ascertain the correct amount of tax payable by a dealer. It cannot be regarded to be a Court properly so called as it does not perform the duty of deciding disputes between the parties and thus does not perform the fundamental function of a Court. To borrow the language of the Privy Council from 1931 AC 275, the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax will be "in the nature of administrative machinery to which the taxpayer can resort at his option in order to have his contentions reconsidered. An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called."

Issues: Whether under the circumstances of the case Section 14 of the Limitation Act extended the period for filing of the revisions by the time during which the restoration applications remained pending as being prosecuted bona fide?

Ratio Decidendi: The Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax while acting under Section 10 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act does not act as a Court but only as a revenue tribunal and hence the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings before him. If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither S. 29 (2) nor Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act will apply to proceedings before him.

Final Decision: The question referred to us is answered in the negative.

Judgement

DWIVEDI, J. :- These are two references under Section 11(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter called the Act). The Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax has made these references. He has formulated a common question of law and has referred the cases for opinion to this Court. The common question of law is this:

"Whether under the circumstances of the case Section 14 of the Limitation Act extended the period for filing of the revisions by the time during which the restoration applications remained pending as being prosecuted bona fide?"

2. Facts giving rise to these references are these: The respondent, M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, carries on business at Kanpur. The Sales Tax Officer assessed sales tax for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 on the respondent. Two separate orders were made. There were two appeals by the respondent. On the date of the hearing of the appeals the respondent was absent. So the appeals were dismissed in default on May 10, 1963. The appeals were dismissed in default by virtue of Rule 68(5) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules. Rule 68(5) allowed dismissal of appeals in default. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 68 provided for setting aside the dismissal in default and for the readmission of the appeal. In accordance with sub-rule (6), the respondent made two applications for setting aside the dismissal in default and for re-admission of the appeals. While these applications were pending, Sri Justice Manchanda held in a case that sub-rule (5) of Rule 68 was ultra vires the rule making authority and that the appellate authority could not dismiss an appeal in default. He held that the appeal should be decided on merits even though the appellant be absent. When the applications came up for hearing on October 10, 1964, the appellate authority dismissed them outright in view of the decision of Sri Justice Manchanda. Then the respondent filed two revisions under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 prescribes a period of limitation for filing a revision. The maximum period of limitation is one year and six months. But the revisions were filed beyond this maximum period. The Judge (Revisions) gave the benefit of Section 14 Limitation Act and excluded the period during which the respondent had been prosecuting the applications for readmission of the appeals. He found, as he should have, that the action of the respondent was bona fide. Excluding the period, he held that the revisions were filed within time. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, then asked the Judge (Revisions) to make a reference to this Court under Sec. 11(1). These are all the essential facts for our purpose.

3. The respondent has not put in appearance. Sri R. R. Agarwala, as amicus curiae, has presented his case before us, and the Court is thankful to him.

4. Coming to the merits, the Act is a special law. It prescribes a period of limitation for filing a revision under Section 10. No period of limitation for filing such a revision is prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. Accordingly Section 29(2) Limitation Act is attracted to the case. By virtue of Section 29(2), Section 14, Limitation Act will apply provided the requirements of that provision are fulfilled in these references and Section 14 is not expressly excluded by the Act.

5. Section 14 consists of two sub-sections. We are not concerned with subsection (1) in these references. Sub-section (2) is material for our purpose. Subsection (2) provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another "civil proceeding", whether in a "court of first instance or in a Court of appeal", against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a "Court" which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Sub-section (2) lays down several conditions. The Standing Counsel has not asserted t



































































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