Hon’ble Mrs. Sunita Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri Sudeep Harkauli, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms. Archana Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

2. The dispute being raised in the present petition is with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court No. 1, Agra in proceeding with Misc. Case No. 860 of 2016 (Gaurav Jain v. Ashok Kumar and others) filed by the respondents on 17.8.2016 seeking leave of the Court to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The main prayer in the present petition is to quash the proceeding of the aforesaid Misc. case and to remand the matter to the Court of the District Judge, Agra. Second prayer is to set aside the order dated 22.12.2016 passed by the District Judge, Agra transferring Misc. Case to the Court of Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No. 1, Agra.

The petitioners herein had filed an objection on 14.2.2017 to the application seeking leave of the Court namely Misc. Case No. 860 of 2016. It is contended that the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No. 1 Agra has no jurisdiction to grant leave and decide the Misc. case No. 860 of 2016 for grant leave to institute the suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Judge, Agra had, therefore, erred in transferring the said case for disposal before the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court, Court No. 1 Agra.

3. With reference to the language of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing of the suit in relation to the public trust of a charitable or religious nature, it is contended that such a suit can be instituted only after having obtained “the leave of the Court” in the “Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction” or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of its jurisdiction. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the “Principal Court of Civil Jurisdiction” would mean only “the District Judge” and the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, cannot be included within the meaning of the Principal Court of Civil jurisdiction. The leave as such, cannot be granted by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Agra for the purpose of institution of suit under Section 92 of the Code in relation to a public charitable or religious trust. He vehemently submits that the literal rule of construction is to be applied for the purpose of interpretation to be given to the words “having obtained the leave of the Court” and “the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction”. No Court other than that of the “District Judge” can be said to be the “Principal Court of Civil Jurisdiction”.

4. It is further contended that no notification whatsoever has been issued by the State Government to empower any other Court in the local limits of jurisdiction of the District Judge, Agra for discharging the functions under Section 92 of the Code. The word “Principal” is singular in nature and would only mean one singular highest Court. The District Judge being the highest Court amongst all the judges of the Civil Court in the hierarchy of Courts would not include all other Additional District Judges, in a district.

Reference has been made to Section 3 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act’ 1887 to submit that amongst the Classes of Courts, the Court of “Additional District Judge” is mentioned at serial No. 2 whereas the Court of the “District Judge” is at serial No. 1 the highest amongst all other judges of the Civil Court.

Reliance is placed upon the judgement of this Court in M/s I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad v. District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1998 All 313, to submit that with reference to the words used in Section 2(e) and Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act’ 1996 it had been held that the Court mentioned therein would mean the “Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction” which would invariably mean