SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.

1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing of the order dated 31.8.2017 which was passed by the Joint Commissioner (Food) Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur.

2. Initially when the respondent no. 4, who was the fair price shop dealer in the area where the petitioner was residing was not running the fair price shop properly, then the petitioner, who was a card holder, alongwith the other card holders, had filed various complaints. Upon an enquiry being held the licence of the respondent no. 4 was cancelled on 10.3.2017. However, when the appeal filed by the respondent no. 4 was allowed on 21.8.2017, the petitioner filed the instant writ petition.

3. Sri Brijesh Yadav has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent no. 4 and has also filed his written submissions. Though the counsel for the respondent no. 4 had submitted that the Appellate Order was correctly passed, he made a preliminary objection to the filing of the writ petition by saying that the petitioner who was a card holder and only a complainant had no locus standi to file the writ petition.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 relied upon Dharam Raj vs. State of U.P. & Others, (2009) 108 RevDec 689 and submitted that the petitioner was only a complainant and had no locus standi to file the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 relied upon paragraph no. 13 and 17 of the judgement and stated that the petitioner was not a person aggrieved and was only someone who could be called a person who was annoyed by the fact that the fair price shop dealer was being allowed to continue with the fair price shop. He submits that a person is considered to be a person aggrieved if an order operates directly and injuriously upon his personal, pecuniary and propriety rights. In this context, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon AIR 2005 AP 45 (Kalva Sudhakar Reddy v. Mandala Sudhakar Reddy).

5. Further, learned counsel submitted that under the garb of being a "necessary party" the complainant could not be permitted to espouse the cause of the general public. A person having only a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in the litigation. He submits that one who approaches the Court will have to establish he has propriety rights which have been violated or are threatened to be violated. In this regard the respondent no. 4 referred to (Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, (1971) AIR SC 385), (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v Roshan Kumar, Hahi Bashir Ahmed & Ors, (1976) AIR SC 578), (Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, (1976) AIR SC 2602), (Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors, (2002) 1 SCC 33) and (Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company & Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 766).

6. Further learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 relied upon a judgment of this Court reported in 2017 (5) ADJ 472 and submitted that someone who was aggrieved by the malfunctioning of the distribution system had a whole machinery of redressal of his or her grievances. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon paragraphs no. 11 to 28 of the above mentioned judgment and submitted that anybody who was aggrieved by the malfunctioning of the public distribution system had a complete machinery for the redressal of his or her grievance and, therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of maintainability at the instance of the petitioner.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply to the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability however submitted as follows:-

I. Writ Court can always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see if there was any illegality committed. In fact, he submitted that the writ court had ample powers to take suo motu cognizance of any illegality which might appear from the record. In this regard, learned counsel for the petition