JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Sri Madhav Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Manohar, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents.

2. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders dated 21.12.2000 and 30.6.1995 passed in proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972[UP PP Act].

3. Pleadings in the petition indicate that proceedings under Section 4 of the UP PP Act were initiated against the petitioner and an order dated 30.6.1995 was passed by the prescribed authority for eviction and damages. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order, an appeal under Section 9 of the Act was filed before the District Judge, Firozabad which also came to be decided in terms of an order dated 21.12.2000 confirming the order of eviction whereas the order with regard to damages was set aside. It was at this stage, that the present writ petition was filed.

4. The issue which arises for determination is, therefore, as to whether an order passed in an appeal under the UP PP Act can be held to be a judicial order passed by a civil court and as to whether the same would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

5. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the petition under Article 226 by pointing out that the order passed in appeal by the appellate officer under the UP PP Act is a judicial order passed by civil court and in view of the authoritative pronouncement made in the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 the same would not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

6. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, the relevant provisions of the UP PP Act would be required to be adverted to.

7. The UP Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 [Act no. 22 of 1972 dated 28 April, 1972] is an Act to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. The provisions of the aforesaid Act which would be relevant for the purposes of the controversy involved in the present case are extracted below:

“2.(b) "premises" means any land (including any forest land or trees standing thereon or covered by water or a road maintained by the State Government or land appurtenant to such road) or any building or part of a building and includes—

(i) the garden, grounds, and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building, and

(ii) any fittings or fixtures affixed to or any furniture supplied with such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof.

But does not include land which for the time being is held by a tenure-holder under any law relating to land tenure.

(d) "Prescribed Authority" means an officer appointed as Prescribed Authority by the State Government under Section 3.

(e) "public premises” means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government, and includes any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of—

(i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital held by the State Government; or

(ii) any local authority; or

(iii) any Corporation (not being a company as defied in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) owned or controlled by the State Government; or

(iv) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the governing body whereof consists, under the rules or regulations of the society, wholly of public officers or nominees of the State Government or both;

and also includes—

(i) Nazul land or any other premises entrusted to the management of a local authority (including any building built with Government funds on lands belonging to the State Government after the entrustment o