IMPORTANT POINT
The court established that divorced daughters are entitled to compassionate appointment, aligning with constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination.

JUDGMENT :

(Ajit Kumar, J.)

Heard Sri P.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Archana Tyagi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. Petitioner's claim for compassionate appointment has been rejected only on the ground that she was a divorced daughter and divorced daughter did not come within the definition of unmarried daughter as stood in the relevant rules framed for compassionate appointments namely U.P. Government Servant Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 (amended from time to time).

3. The order impugned dated 12.9.2019 has been assailed on the ground that the division bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 60881 of 2015 (Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another) decided on 4.12.2015, rendered words and expressions ''unmarried daughter'' as totally unconstitutional being discriminatory and arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India. This judgment was later on followed in Special Appeal Defective No. 863 of 2015 (Neha Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another) decided on 23.12.2015 and further special leave petition against the judgment of Neha Srivastava came to be dismissed (SLP (C) No. 22646 of 2016) on 23.7.2019.

4. Per contra, defending the order impugned, it is argued by Ms. Archana Tyagi, learned Additional Chief Counsel that the Court addressed the issue of claim qua 'married daughter' and 'unmarried daughter' and not the 'divorced daughter' as this expression not included in the rules. She further submits that the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 came to be amended only in the year 2021 and now word 'daughter' is incorporated under 2c(iii) of the said rules. She submits that the amendments shall not have retrospective effect and now here onwards only the 'divorced daughter', if at all, can be considered.

5. In rejoinder, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that Dying in Harness Rules, 1979 is a piece of beneficial legislation and, therefore, it is to be interpreted in light of the law laid down by division bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) followed in Smt. Neha Srivastava (supra).

6. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and the judgments cited before this Court, what I have come to notice is that earlier the provision 2c(iii) carried the words and expressions 'unmarried daughter', 'married daughter', 'widowed daughter' and 'widowed daughters-in-law'. Thus, there was no mention of 'divorced daughter'. The very intendment behind the legislation to incorporate the 'widowed daughter' in the amended provision has been to treat her back as member of the family of dependent and therefore exclusion of words and expressions 'divorced daughter' does not appeal to reason. Whether the daughter has gone widow on account of death of her husband or has been divorced, they stand on a same footing rather, it would be more appropriate to say that divorced daughter stands on a better footing because widowed daughter may get share in the properties of the deceased husband whereas the divorced daughter is completely divorced from everything belong to her ex-husband including his estate except the permanent alimony that she may get. This Court in Vimla Srivastava's case while considered this aspect of the matter that the use of words and expressions 'unmarried daughter' to the exclusion of 'married daughter' was not a constitutionally sound provision as the married daughter stood discriminated against. The Court made note of the arguments :

''The basic rationale and the foundation for granting compassionate appointment is thus the financial need of the family of a deceased Government servant who has died in harness and it is with a view to alleviate financial distress that compassionate appointment is granted.

The submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioners in challenging Rule 2 (c) (iii), insofar as it confines the zone of eligibility