IMPORTANT POINT
Suspension orders must be based on objective evidence of a departmental inquiry, not merely on preliminary inquiries.

JUDGMENT :

Prakash Padia, J.

1. Heard Sri Vijay Gautam, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Atipriya Gautam, and Anurag Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt. Shivi Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

2. The challenge in the instant writ petition is to an order of suspension dated 24.1.2024. Since the impugned order is assailed only on a legal ground, learned counsel for parties have consented to the disposal of the present petition without exchange of affidavits.

3. The order of suspension is assailed principally on the ground that although the power to suspend an employee inheres in the respondent to be exercised in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings as provided under the 1991 Rules, the communication appearing at page-27 of the paper book dated 13.2.2024 establishes that the power to suspend has been exercised while a preliminary enquiry is being undertaken. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid communication clearly establishes that the impugned order represents a colorable exercise of power without satisfaction having been recorded on the issue of a regular departmental enquiry being necessitated.

4. Undisputedly the law with respect to the ambit of the power to suspend under the 1991 Rules stands settled in light of the judgment rendered by a learned Judge of the Court in Sachchida Nand Tripathi v. State of U.P. and others [Writ A No. 69308 of 2013]. Dealing with an identical question the learned Judge in Sachchida Nand Tripathi held thus:

“11. On this aspect, I am fortified by the observations made by Full Bench in Raj Veer Singh (supra). While answering question (b), the Court said that word “inquiry” under the Rules cannot include a preliminary enquiry and it means a regular departmental enquiry as held by Larger Bench in Jay Singh Dixit (supra) and question No. (b) was answered accordingly. However, while further considering question No. (b) and (c), the Court noticed Larger Bench decision and observed that whether a preliminary enquiry has been conducted or not, or, if conducted, but is not complete, that by itself would not vitiate an order of suspension inasmuch as in order to make an order of suspension valid, what is required is that the competent authority has satisfied itself on objective consideration of material that a regular departmental enquiry is contemplated and if it is already pending, the question of preliminary enquiry would not arise at all. This is evident from what has been said in para 43 and 46 of the judgment reproduced as under:

“43. The answer No. 1 by the Full Bench is to the effect that Rule 17(1)(a) of the 1991 Rules does not prohibit passing of suspension order during pendency of preliminary inquiry. The five Judges Larger Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Dingh Dixit case (supra) had considered the question in context of Rule 49-A of the C.C.A. Rules, which is a pari materia rule. As notice above, the three Judges Full Bench in State of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (supra) has taken the view that the occasion for passing a suspension order shall arise only when a firm decision is taken to hold an inquiry and at any earlier point of time the power of suspension cannot be exercised. The aforesaid view of the three Judges Full Bench in State of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (supra) was disapproved by the Full Bench. As noticed above, the rationale of three Judges judgment in State of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (supra) was that till a preliminary inquiry is not completed, no firm decision can be taken by the appointing authority for suspension. The five Judges Larger Bench in paragraph 37, while considering the question as to when departmental inquiry can be said to have been contemplated, has laid down that a departmental inquiry is contemplated when on objective consideration of the material the appointing authority considers the case as one which would lead to a departmental, inquiry, irrespective of whether any preliminary inquiry, summary or det