IMPORTANT POINT
The court affirmed that the District Magistrate has the authority to cease a Pradhan's powers pending inquiry, and that the preliminary inquiry process does not necessitate the Pradhan's involvement.

JUDGMENT :

Dinesh Pathak, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record on board.

2. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 29.2.2024 passed by District Magistrate, Bijnor (respondent No. 2) under Section 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (in brevity Act, 1947) read with Rule 5 of Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up Pradhans and Members) Enquiry, Rules, 1997 (in brevity Enquiry Rules, 1997) whereby administrative and financial power of the incumbent Pradhan (petitioner) has been ceased and, simultaneously, regular inquiry has been directed to be conducted.

3. The facts culled out from the record are that petitioner is an elected Pradhan in the Panchayat Election 2020-21. During his tenure being Pradhan, a complaint has been moved by private person, namely, Khursheed and Rafeeq Ahmad pointing out some embezzlement in the development work done by the petitioner. Considering the severity of the matter, District Magistrate on behalf of State Government has constituted a committee, vide order dated 28.4.2023, consists of two members to conduct preliminary inquiry against the incumbent Pradhan intending to examine the allegations made against her. After due inquiry, Committee has submitted its preliminary inquiry report dated 9/10.11.2023, whereby four charges have been levelled against the present petitioner relating to the financial embezzlement. Having considered the preliminary inquiry report dated 9/10.11.2023, District Magistrate, Bijnor has issued notice to the petitioner, vide its order dated 28/25.11.2023 (Annexure 3), affording opportunity to file her reply, if any, within 15 days. In pursuance thereof, petitioner has filed her reply dated 4.1.2024. Having considered the reply submitted by the Pradhan insufficient, learned District Magistrate has passed order dated 29.2.2024 under Section 95(1)(g) of Act, 1947 read with Rule 5 of the Enquiry Rules, 1997, by which Inquiry Committee has been constituted consist of Project Director, District Village Development Agency, Bijnor as well as Executive Engineer, P.W.D. Bijnor and, simultaneously, ceased the financial and administrative power of the Pradhan, which is under challenge before this Court.

4. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that in preliminary inquiry petitioner was not permitted to participate. Apart from that, report was submitted at a very belated stage on 09/10.11.2023 in pursuance of the order dated 28/25.4.2023, to wit, beyond the prescribed period of limitation as enunciated under Rule 4(2) of Enquiry Rules, 1997, therefore, preliminary enquiry report as well as the entire subsequent proceedings based on said report is nullity in the eye of law. It is further submitted that exonerating the Secretary from the allegations is not justifiable inasmuch as his conduct is also liable to be inquired alongwith the petitioner. In his third submission, learned Senior Advocate has tried to question genuineness/validity of the charges relating to GST and submit that all these charges are vague and result of misleading document. Lastly it is submitted that the instant writ petition may be allowed and the order impugned passed by the District Magistrate may be quashed being illegal, cryptic and unwarranted under the law.

5. Par contra, learned Standing counsel has vehemently opposed the submissions as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and supported the order impugned passed by the District Magistrate. He has contended that full opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner before passing the order impugned dated 29.2.2024. Petitioner, at this stage, has no right to raise any question qua charges inasmuch as regular inquiry is going on. It is further contended that submission of preliminary enquiry report even after prescribed period of limitation does not make it redundant in the eye of law. It is next