IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
PANKAJ BHATIA, J.
Prem Sagar Vishwakarma - Appellant
Versus
Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Lko. And 2 Others - Respondents
Writ C.No.8451 of 2023
Decided on : 22-12-2023
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. legal representation and background of the case. (Para 1 , 2 , 8) |
| 2. impugned order’s reliance on statutory provisions. (Para 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 3. arguments from both parties regarding limitation. (Para 6 , 7 , 13) |
| 4. court's ruling based on legal interpretations. (Para 9 , 12 , 14) |
| 5. impact of repealing the industrial disputes amendment act. (Para 10 , 11) |
| 6. order for remand to tribunal for merit-based decision. (Para 15) |
JUDGMENT :
PANKAJ BHATIA, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned ASG assisted by Sri Anand Dwivedi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents no.1 and 2.
2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 27.04.2023 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 2 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was dismissed as being time barred.
3. On perusal of the order impugned, it is clear that the Industrial Tribunal while rejecting the application relied upon the provisions of Section 2A as contained in the Act and introduced by virtue of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010.
4. On perusal of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 being Act No.24 of 2010, which came into effect on 15.09.2010, Section 2A was amended providing limitation for moving an application. A period of three years was prescribed for filing an appropriate application.
5. As the application filed by the petitioner was beyond period of three years, the impugned order came to be passed dismissing the application on the ground that the same was barred by limitation prescribed under Section 2A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
6. The Counsel for the petitioner has produced a copy of The Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 being Act No.23 of 2016. It is argued that The Repealing Act being Act No.23 of 2016 has repealed the entire Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 and thus, the application filed by the petitioner was maintainable and the Tribunal has erred in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.
7. The learned ASG, on the other hand, placing reliance on an order dated 20.01.2023 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Lucknow in ID No.89/ 2021; VD Jha vs Scooter India Limited along with other cases, argues on behalf of the respondents that in this aspect what repealed and what replaced was considered by the Tribunal in its judgment. He argues that in view thereof, the submission of the Counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected.
8. It appears from the record that the services of the petitioner was terminated vide order dated 30.12.2013 and the application was preferred under Section 2A on 21.08.2017.
9. In terms of the arguments advanced in between the parties, the sole issue to be decided by this Court is with regard to the rights of the petitioner to have approached for redressal of his grievance before the authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. In terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act particularly Section 2A(3) read with the Repealing and Amending Act, 2016, it has already been noted above that services of the petitioner were come to an end on 30.12.2013, the date upto which allegedly the petitioner worked with the organization and was not allowed to work thereafter. To understand the said controversy, it is essential to note the provisions as contained in Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act is quoted below:
Fibre Boards Private Limited, Bangalore vs Commissioner of of Income Tax
The repeal of Section 2A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act allows claims previously barred by limitation to be maintainable, enabling redressal of grievances post-repeal.
The repeal of Section 2A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act removed the limitation for filing applications for redressal, allowing the petitioner to approach the Tribunal without restriction.
The Labour Court cannot entertain applications under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 beyond the three-year limitation period from the date of dismissal, as this limitation is mandator....
Non-compliance with the mandatory provision of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 renders the dismissal order void and inoperative, and the employer is bound to treat the employee ....
The court affirmed that dismissal without approval under Section 33(2)(b) is inoperative, and the employee is deemed to continue in service until approval is granted.
Dismissal during pendency of industrial proceedings without Section 33(2)(b) approval renders it inoperative; workman deemed continuing in service with automatic reinstatement and adjusted back wages....
A workman must demonstrate that an industrial dispute remains alive despite delays; failure to do so renders the dispute stale and unenforceable.
Section 2-A of Act reads as dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.
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