The repeal of Section 2A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act removed the limitation for filing applications for redressal, allowing the petitioner to approach the Tribunal without restriction.

JUDGMENT

Pankaj Bhatia, J.

Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned ASG assisted by Sri Anand Dwivedi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents no.1 and 2.

2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 27.04.2023 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 2 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was dismissed as being time barred.

3. On perusal of the order impugned, it is clear that the Industrial Tribunal while rejecting the application relied upon the provisions of Section 2A as contained in the Act and introduced by virtue of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010.

4. On perusal of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 being Act No.24 of 2010, which came into effect on 15.09.2010, Section 2A was amended providing limitation for moving an application. A period of three years was prescribed for filing an appropriate application.

5. As the application filed by the petitioner was beyond period of three years, the impugned order came to be passed dismissing the application on the ground that the same was barred by limitation prescribed under Section 2A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

6. The Counsel for the petitioner has produced a copy of The Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 being Act No.23 of 2016. It is argued that The Repealing Act being Act No.23 of 2016 has repealed the entire Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 and thus, the application filed by the petitioner was maintainable and the Tribunal has erred in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner.

7. The learned ASG, on the other hand, placing reliance on an order dated 20.01.2023 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Lucknow in ID No.89/ 2021; VD Jha v. Scooter India Limited along with other cases, argues on behalf of the respondents that in this aspect what repealed and what replaced was considered by the Tribunal in its judgment. He argues that in view thereof, the submission of the Counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected.

8. It appears from the record that the services of the petitioner was terminated vide order dated 30.12.2013 and the application was preferred under Section 2A on 21.08.2017.

9. In terms of the arguments advanced in between the parties, the sole issue to be decided by this Court is with regard to the rights of the petitioner to have approached for redressal of his grievance before the authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. In terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act particularly Section 2A(3) read with the Repealing and Amending Act, 2016, it has already been noted above that services of the petitioner were come to an end on 30.12.2013, the date upto which allegedly the petitioner worked with the organization and was not allowed to work thereafter. To understand the said controversy, it is essential to note the provisions as contained in Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act is quoted below:

"[2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute. (1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen