2011 (2) UAD 410
UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT
Tarun Agarwala, Prafulla C. Pant and
Sudhanshu Dhulia
Writ Petition P.I.L. No. 1018 of 2008
AJAY GOYAL – Petitioner
Versus
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. – Respondents
Decided on : 10.05.2011
(B) Jurisprudence — Adaptation of a provision by a reference or citation or by incorporation is an accepted device of legislation — If the adapting Act refers to certain provisions of an earlier existing Act — It is known as legislation by reference but if the provisions of another Act are bodily lifted and incorporated in the new Act, it is known as legislation by incorporation — It is a matter of probe into legislative intention and/or taking an insight into the working of the enactment if one or the other view is adopted — Therefore, the kind of language used in the provision, the scheme and purpose of the Act assume significance in finding answer to the question — The doctrinaire approach to ascertain whether the legislation is by incorporation or reference is, on ultimate analysis, directed towards that end. (Para 27)
¼v½ mÙkj izns'k E;wfuLiSfyVh ,DV] 1916] /kkjk 128] dSaVksuesaV ,DV] 1924] /kkjk 60 & dSaVksuesaV ,DV ds vUrxZr dSaVksuesaV dh dkuwuh 'kfDr vkSj mñizñ E;wfuLisfyVh ,DV ds vUrxZr E;wfuLisfyVh dh dkuwuh 'kfDr & fu.kZ; esa dgk x;k ,d ckj /kkjk 128 ds rgr VSDl vken djus dk vf/kdkj E;wfuLisfyVh ls E;wfuLisfyVh ,DV ds vUrxZr okfil ys fy;k tkrk gS rks dSaVksuesaV cksMZ okguksa ds izos'k ij VSDl vken djus dk vfèkdkj /kkjk 60 dSUVksuesaV ,DV esa Hkh lekIr gks tkrk gS & /kkjk 60¼1½ dSaVksuesaV ,DV ds rgr VSDl yxkus dk vf/kdkj vf/kd ls vf/kd ml fLFkfr ij vk/kkfjr gS tc mlh izdkj dk vf/kdkj E;wfuLisfyVh ,DV ds rgr Hkh fn;k tkrk gSA ¼izLrj 26] 30] 31½ ¼c½ fof/k 'kkL= & fdlh izkfo/kku dk vuqdwyu tks fdlh izlax] vFkok m)j.k] vFkok iwoZ ds lekos'k ls gqvk gks] dkuwu dh ,d LohÑr i|fr gS & ;fn vuqdwfyr vf/kfu;e fdlh iwoZ vf/kfu;e ds dqN izkfo/kkuksa dk mYys[k djrk gS rks mls izlaxor dkuwu dgrs gSa] ijUrq ;fn fdlh vU; vf/kfu;e ds izkfo/kku T;ksa ds R;ksa mBkdj uohu vfèkfu;e esa lfEefyr fd;s tkrs gSa rks bls iwoZ ds vuq#i vf/kfu;e dgk tkrk gS & ;g dkuwuh n`f"Vdks.k dk ekeyk gS vkSj ;fn vf/kfu;e dh dk;Zi|fr dk voyksdu djsa rks ,d vFkok fofHké n`f"Vdks.k viuk;k tkrk gS & blfy, izkfo/kku esa ftl fdLe dh Hkk"kk dk iz;ksx fd;k tkrk gS rks vf/kfu;e dh ;kstuk vkSj mn~ns'; fdlh iz'u dk gy ryk'kus ds fy, egRoiw.kZ cu tkrh gS & vf/kfu;e ;k fd lfEeyu vFkok izlax ds }kjk l`ftr gS rks mldh lS)kfUrd igq¡p dks tkapus ds okLrs vafre :i ls fo'ys"k.k ds fy, ml lhek rd funsZf'kr dh tkrh gSA ¼izLrj 27½
[Per: Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.]
1. This case has come up before us upon a reference made by a Division Bench, which felt that the decision of another Division Bench on the point in question requires reconsideration and accordingly framed a question for its decision, namely,
“whether after the power to levy toll on motor vehicles by the Municipalities was expressly withdrawn, on the strength of Notification issued by the Cantonment Board prior to withdrawal of such power, the Cantonment Board can continue to collect toll on motor vehicles.”
2. The brief facts is, that the Municipalities were imposing tax on entry of vehicles under Section 128 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. With effect from 01st August, 1991, the levy of toll tax on entry of vehicles in the municipal area was abolished and, since then, no tax on entry of vehicles is being levied in a municipal area.
3. However, the Cantonment Board, Dehradun continued to levy tax on entry of vehicles in its cantonment area. The collection of such tax was challenged in Arun Kumar Jaiswal Vs. Cantonment Board, Dehradun & another 2004 (2) U.D. 401, which was dismissed by a judgment dated 01.09.2004 passed by a Division Bench of this Court, holding that the Cantonment Board had the jurisdiction and power to levy tax on entry of vehicles. The Division Bench held as under :-
“10. In view of sub-section (vii) and (viii) of Section 128 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916, since the toll and octroi could be imposed by the Municipalities of the State of U.P., the Cantonment Board situated with those Municipalities were also competent to impose and collect the octroi/toll. The clause “for the time being in force” used by the Legislature under u/s 60 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 clearly spells out the intention of the Legislatures that when the Cantonment Board decides to impose a tax, it can impose only those tax, which could be imposed by the Municipal Board in the State under any enactment for the time being in force’, wherein such cantonment is situated. Thus, at the time of imposition of tax under section 60 of the Cantonment Act, the power of Municipal Board to impose a tax under any enactment is to be seen. The taxes, which are to be imposed under section 60, by the Cantonment Board, have been adopted from the law, ‘for the time being in force’, empowering the Municipality, wherein such Cantonment is located. ‘For the time being in force’ means ‘at the time of imposition of tax’. Therefore, it is an adoption of taxes. Once tax is imposed at any point of time, when that may be imposed by the Municipality in the State by Notification in accordance with the provisions of section 61, 62 and 63 of the Cantonment Act, the taxes so imposed, stands adopted. Subsequent amendment in the Local Act will not nullify the prior imposition of tax as ‘at that point of time’ the provisions existed empowering the municipality to impose such tax.”
4. The Division Bench held the Cantonment Board had the power to levy a tax under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, since the Municipality had the power to levy a tax on entry of vehicles. The Division Bench held that even though the power to levy a tax on entry of vehicles was abolished in the Municipalities Act, nonetheless, the Cantonment Board could continue to levy tax on entry of vehicles, since the power to levy tax by a Cantonment Board was to be seen at the time of the imposition of the tax. The Division Bench, explained that the words “for the time being in force” used in Section 60 of the Cantonments Act meant “at the time of imposition of tax”.
5. Subsequently, in a P.I.L., another Division Bench while hearing a matter with regard to the levy of the tax on entry of vehicles, had an occasion to consider the judgment in Arun Kumar Jaiswal’s case (supra) passed by the Division Bench (supra) and disagreed with the reasoning adopted therein. The Division Bench in Writ Petition PIL No. 1018 of 2008 held :
“Section 60 of th
2. Anna Transport Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s Safe Service Ltd. & others 1992 (1) SCC 401.
6. Management of M.C.D. vs. Prem Chand Gupta & another AIR 2000 SC 454.
7. Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vs. Coop. Bank Employees Union 2007 (4) SCC 685.
8. Rakesh Vij Vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi & others 2005 (8) SCC 504.
11. Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi & Ors. AIR 1963 SC 553.
14. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam & anothers AIR 1998 SC 1028.
22. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam & another AIR 1998 SC 1028.
1. Arun Kumar Jaiswal Vs. Cantonment Board
5. Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH Etc. Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. 1999(9) SCC 334.
12. Bolani Ores Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa 1974 (2) SCC 777.
13. State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. M.V. Narasimhan AIR 1975 SC 1835.
15. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation Vs. K.O. Varghese & others 2003 (12) SCC 293.
16. State of West Bengal Vs. Kedarnath Rajgarhia Charit. Trust Estate 2004 (12) SCC 425.
17. P.C. Agarwala Vs. Payment of Wages Inspector M.P. (2005) 8 SCC 104.
19. Cantonment Board viz. Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Vasantrao 2002 (7) SCC 657.
20. Bhikha Ram Vs. Ram Sarup 1992 (1) SCC 319.
21. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 1979 (2) SCC 529.
23. P.C. Agarwala v. Payment of Wages Inspector M.P. (2005) 8 SCC 104.
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