2002(7) Supreme 15
Supreme Court of India
(From Mumbai High Court)
B.N. Kirpal, CJI., Shivaraj V. Patil & B.P. Singh, JJ.
Nagpur Improvement Trust —Appellant
versus
Vasantrao & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 1164-1200 of 1993
With
C.A.Nos. 9209, 9210, 9213, 9214, 9260-9261/95, SLP (C) Nos. 8256-8259/93, C.A.Nos. 839/95, 3789/92, SLP (C) No. 12949/92, 3331/93, C.A.Nos. 9207, 9206/95, SLP (C) No. 3210/99, C.A.No. 9211, 9212, 9208/95, 6590, 6591, 6592 of 2001
Decided on 26-9-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Rakesh Dwivedi, V.A. Mohta, Rajinder Sachar, Ujagar Singh, N.N. Goswami, Subodh Markandeya, Sr. Advocates, Ms. Vimla Sinha, Abhishek Chaudhary, Sunil Kumar Verma, T. Raja, M.K. Dua, Arvind Minocha, Ms. Madhu Moolochandani, Sunil Kumar Verma, S.C. Patel, V.B. Saharya, K.K. Mohan, Amrish Kumar, E.C. Agrawala, N.M. Popli, Sanjeev K. Singh, Ms. Vrindha Dhar, A.K. Sanghi, K.C. Jain, Mrs. Kawaljit Kochar, S.C. Paul, C.L. Bashal, Ms. Sonal Mahajan, J.D. Jain, R.S. Lambat, Uday Umesh Lalit, S.M. Jadhav, Sanjeev Malhotra, Ravindra Bana, S.M. Sarin, P.N. Puri, Devendra Verma, Satish Vig, S.S. Shinde, S.V. Deshpande, P.N. Gupta, Nischal Kumar, Vineet Kumar, Mahabir Singh, R.K. Talwar, Yash Pal Dhingra, Harinder Mohan Singh, Anil Hooda, Ms. Indu Goswamy, Bhargava V. Desai, Ms. Sweta Kakkad, Alok Gupta, Mohan Babu Agarwal, Kamlendra Misra, Ms. Chitra Markandaya, K.C. Jain, Advocates.
Held : The claimant is entitled to interest on the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act including all the sub-sections thereof, meaning thereby sub-sections (1), (1-A) and (2) of Section 23. (Para 28)
(ii) Interpretation of Statutes—The incorporation of an earlier statute in a later Act and reference or the citation of an earlier statute in a later Act—Distinction.
Held : The law on the subject is well settled. When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been bodily transposed into it. The incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. But this must be distinguished from a referential legislation which merely contains a reference or the citation of the provisions of an earlier statute. In a case where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second. The later Act alongwith the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act constitute an independent legislation which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act. However, where in later Act there is a mere reference to an earlier Act, the modification, repeal or amendment of the statute that is referred, will also have an effect on the statute in which it is referred. It is equally well settled that the question whether a former statute is merely referred to or cited in a later statute, or whether it is wholly or partially incorporated therein, is a question of construction. (Para 30)
Held also : It is also well settled that the question as to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the earlier decision and other relevant circumstances. (Para 35)
(iii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894—Sections 6, 23(2) and 28—Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922—The Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936—The Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965—Whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, particularly Sections 6, 23(2) and 28 thereof stand incorporated in the three State Acts or whether the land Acquisition Act has been merely referred in the State Acts? (The former with a clarification) 1998(2) SCC 467 relied on and 1991(4) SCC 368 (dissented from) (Constitution of India—Article 14—Vice of arbitrary and hostile discrimination).
Held : So far as the U.P. Act is concerned the judgment in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainul Islam and another (supra) answers all the questions raised before us. It has been held that so far as the U.P. Act is concerned, the Land Acquisition Act, as modified, stands incorporated in the U.P. Act. However, as a matter of construction it was held that Section 55 of the U.P. Act, while incorporating the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act intended to apply to acquisition made under the U.P. Act the beneficial amendments that may be brought about for determination and payment of compensation, in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There was nothing in the U.P. Act which precluded the Court from adopting such a construction, and this was necessary to save the Act from the vice of arbitrary and hostile discrimination. This Court also found that the provisions of the Nagpur Act, with which we are concerned, were similar to the provisions of the U.P. Act. This aspect of the matter has been discussed in paragraph 27 of the report. We have also considered the provisions of the Nagpur Act as well as the provisions of the Punjab Act. We are satisfied that the aforesaid two Acts as well as the U.P. Act have a common scheme and pattern. All the three legislations relate to town planning and development, and each one of them specifies the various schemes that may be undertaken. For acquisition of land for the purposes of any of the schemes under the said Acts, the Land Acquisition Act 1894 has been made applicable with certain modifications as contained in the schedule to the said Acts which are numerous and substantial. The modifications made are also similar. We have found no distinction in the three Acts which may have a bearing on the question relating to legislative incorporation of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Acts. We are, therefore, of the view that what has been held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainul Islam and another (supra) with regard to U.P. Act holds good for the Punjab Act as well as the Nagpur Act. Consequently we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Bhatinda Improvement Trust vs. Balwant Singh and others (supra) that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have not been incorporated into the Punjab Act and that they have merely been cited or referred to in the Punjab Act. (Paras 47 and 48)
Held also : It may be noticed that in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainul Islam and another (supra) this Court highlighted the fact that though under the Land Acquisition Act as amended in its application to the State of U.P. there was no provision for grant of solatium, by the U.P. Act such solatium was provided for. The intention of the legislature was apparent that it wanted to confer the benefit of solatium by modifying Section 23(2), which benefit was not available under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as it was applicable in the State of U.P. at the time of enactment of the U.P. Act. So far as the Punjab Act and the Nagpur Act are concerned, the schedules do not modify the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act which provides for payment of solatium. However, a proviso was added to the effect that sub-section (2) shall not apply to any land acquired under the State Acts in question. The added proviso is identical in both the State Acts. This clearly implies that where acquisition was made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as modified, the legislature did not intend to deprive the claimants of solatium as provided under the Land Acquisition Act. But solatium was not payable in cases of acquisition under the State Acts. There are provisions in both the State Acts which permit the State to acquire lands for the purposes of the schemes without resorting to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act such as acquisition by purchase, lease, exchange, or otherwise, or acquisitions contemplated under deferred street scheme, development scheme and expansion scheme. In respect of such acquisitions solatium is not payable. Such cases are similar to the acquisitions under Section 53 of the Bombay Town Planning Act which was considered by this Court in Prakash Amichand Shah vs. State of Gujarat and others (supra). In these circumstances with a view to save the law from the vice of arbitrary and hostile discrimination, the provisions must be construed to mean, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the 1984 Act relating to determination and payment of compensation would apply to acquisition of land for the purposes of the State Acts. It must, therefore, be held that while incorporating the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Acts, the intention of the legislature was that amendments in the Land Acquisition Act relating to determination and payment of compensation would be applicable to acquisition of lands for the purposes of the State Acts. Consequently the claimants are entitled to the benefits conferred by Section 23(1-A), if applicable, and Section 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the 1984 Act for acquisition of land for the purposes of the State Acts under Sections 59 of both the Nagpur and the Punjab Acts. (Para 49)
Judgment
B.P. Singh, J.—In this batch of appeals and special leave petitions the common question which arises for consideration is whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, particularly Sections 6, 23(2) and 28 thereof stand incorporated in the three State Acts with which we are concerned in these matters or whether the Land Acquisition Act has been merely referred to in the State Acts. If it is held that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act stand legislatively incorporated in the State Acts, the subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act will have no effect upon the acquisitions made under the State Acts. We are concerned with three State Acts, namely, The Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Punjab Act ); The Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Nagpur Act’) and The Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act ).
2. C.A. Nos. 9206 to 9214 of 1995; C.A. Nos. 9260-9261 of 1995: C.A. No. 3789 of 1992; SLP (C) No. 12949/1992; SLP (C) No. 3331/1993 & SLP (C) No. 3210/1999 relate to acquisitions made under the Punjab Act. C.A. No. 839 of 1995 and C.A. Nos. 6590 to 6292 of 2001 relate to acquisitions under the U.P. Act while C.A. Nos. 1164-2000 of 1993 and SLP (C) Nos. 8256-8259 of 1993 relate to acquisitions made under the Nagpur Act.
3. In the matters arising under the Punjab Act, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the claimants, whose lands were acquired under the Punjab Act were entitled to additional compensation under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 as also to the solatium under Section 23(2) and interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. The Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Union of India and Anr. vs. Zora Singh and Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 673 : Nagpur Improvement Trust and another vs. Vithal Rao and others : AIR 1973 SC 689 as also the full Bench of that Court in Harbans Kaur and others vs. Ludhiana Improvement Trust and others : 1973 P.L.J. 250.
4. In the appeals which relate to the acquisitions under the Nagpur Act, the appellant, namely the Nagpur Improvement Trust, has impugned the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench), Nagpur, holding that the Land Acquisition Act is merely referred to in the Nagpur Act and, therefore, the provisions of Section 6 including the proviso thereto apply to acquisitions under the Nagpur Act. Since the notice under Section 39 of the Nagpur Act corresponding to the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was first published in the official gazette on 25th December, 1969 and the subsequent Notification under Section 45 corresponding to the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 18th September, 1974 i.e. after more than three years, the same deserves to be quashed since the notice published under Section 39 of the Act lapsed on expiry of three years from the date of its publication, and no action pursuant to the said notice could have been taken thereafter.
5. In Civil Appeal No. 839 of 1995 which arises under the U.P. Act, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissed the writ petitions challenging the acquisitions before it holding that Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was legislatively incorporated in the U.P. Act which was of the year 1965, and that the subsequent amendment of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in the year 1967 did not affect the provisions of the U.P. Act including Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as incorporated in the U.P. Act. It, therefore, rejected the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that acquisition proceedings lapsed on expiry of the period of three years from the date of issuance of Notification under Section 28 of the U.P. Act which corresponds with Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The High Court relied upon its Full Bench
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