The determination of whether an entity qualifies as an 'industry' under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act should be based on the nature of its activities, and the power of reference under the Act is an administrative function that should not involve delving into the merits of the dispute.

JUDGMENT :

MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, J.

1. Petitioner has challenged the order dated 23.01.2013 passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, Garhwal Region, Dehradun, whereby it has refused to refer the industrial dispute raised by petitioner to Labour Court, while exercising power under Section 4-K of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, which is reproduced below:

“4-K. Reference of disputes to Labour Court or Tribunal - Where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute to a Labour Court if the matter of industrial dispute is one of those contained in the First Schedule, or to a Tribunal if the matter of dispute is one contained in the First Schedule or the Second Schedule for adjudication:

Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the State Government may, if it, so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court.”

2. The ground taken for refusing to refer the dispute is that the employer does not come within the definition of ‘industry’. The employer, in the present case is Parmarth Niketan Ashram, which is engaged in religious and charitable activities. According to petitioner, he was a permanent employee of Parmarth Niketan Ashram, where he served as Electrician since 01.01.1995 till his termination, on 20.11.2005. It is further his contention that neither any notice nor retrenchment compensation was given to him, therefore, his termination by employer is illegal.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon a judgment rendered by Shri Devadeveshwar Sansthan Parvati and Kothrud vs. Sushila Raghu Kadu, 2002 SCC Online Bom. 84, where it was held that merely because part of activity of the trust was religious and spiritual, would not be sufficient to hold that trust is not an ‘industry’. Para 7 and 8 of the said judgment are reproduced below:

“7. Evidence before the Labour Court amply indicates that the petitioner is an “industry” and, therefore, covered by the definition contained in S. 2(j) of the Act. The petitioner trust maintains not only the temples but also a museum and gallery. An entrance fee is charged by the petitioner for the museum and the gallery. The poojas and Abhisheks axe conducted on collection of charges from the devotees. Huge properties are being maintained by the petitioner trust. 40 employees are working with the petitioner trust on regular salary with fixed conditions of service. The offerings made in the temples are auctioned and the petitioner trust also runs a sugarcane juice stall at the Parvati Deoasthan. Mrutunjay Mandir which is maintained by the petitioner is let out on hire for the purpose of marriage ceremonies. The petitioner collects this amount as also the hire charges for utensils used for such functions. Therefore, I do not find any error committed by the Labour Court much less an error on the face of the record.

8. In the case of Sri Cutchi Visa Oswal Case 1986 (2) L.L.N. 904 (vide supra), this Court considered whether the religious trust owning extensive properties and doing service at such properties by engaging large number of persons could be termed as an “industry.” This Court came to the conclusion that merely because part of the activity of the trust is religious and spiritual, it should not be said that the trust was not an “industry.” In Sri Gajanan Maharaj Sanstan Case 1997 (2) L.L.N. 124 (vide supra), this Court on the basis of the Bangalore Water Supply Case 1978 (1) L.L.N. 376 and 657 (vide supra), of the Apex Court, has held that the systematic activity wherein 157 workmen were involved could by no stretch of imagination be considered not an “industry.” Applying the ration in these cases to the facts and circumstances in the present case, the inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner is an “industry.”

4. Mr. D.S. M