The State Government is required to place before the Court the necessary materials to show that it had taken into consideration the explanation furnished by the petitioner before passing an order under Section 41(1)(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.

( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 27th April, 1978 passed by the State Government under section 41 (1) (a) of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, removing the petitioner from the office of the Councillor of Municipal council, Susner, with effect from the date of the order and further directing under Sub-section (4) of Section 41 of the Act that the petitioner shall be disqualified for further election, selection or reappointment to the office of the councillor for a period of four years from the date of his removal from the membership of the Council.

( 2 ) THIS petition initially came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this court which, by its order dated 21st September, 1978, held that the decision reported in Laxminarayan v. State of M. P. (1974 MPLJ 314) : (AIR 1975 Madh pra 71) holding that the State Government, while passing an order of removal under Section 41 (2) of the Act, was not required to state reasons, required reconsideration and hence the matter deserved to be considered by a larger bench. That is how, this petition came up for hearing before this Full Bench constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

( 3 ) THE material facts giving rise to this petition briefly are as follows : The petitioner is an Advocate and was at the material time a member and also the president of the Municipal Council, Susner, hereinafter referred to as the council. He held the office of President of the Council from 15th April, 1965 to 27th April, 1978 excluding the period from 12th October, 1973 to 5th April, 1975 when the Council had been dissolved under the provisions of Section 36 (3) of the Act. On 18th March, 1978, the respondent State served a notice on the petitioner under the provisions of Section 41 (3) of the Act calling upon the petitioner to show cause, within fifteen days of the receipt of notice, as to why he should not be removed from the membership of the Council under Section 41 (1) of the Act, the said notice charged the petitioner as follows :--[matter in hindi omitted.--ED]. The petitioner did not ask for copies of any documents or any further particulars to enable him to effectively reply to the various allegations made against him in the aforesaid notice. A detailed explanation (annexure A-2), running into ten typed pages, was submitted by the petitioner on 1st April, 1978 denying the allegations made against him and further alleging that the aforesaid charges were levelled against him on account of his being a member of a rival political party. Along with his explanation, petitioner submitted twenty-eight documents relied upon by him for his defence. On the same day, the petitioner submitted an application praying that he be granted a personal hearing and is he was a very busy advocate, he should be given intimation of the date of hearing fifteen days in advance. Another application was made by him praying that in case he was not granted personal hearing, the documents referred to by him in the application should be sent for and looked into. No personal hearing was given to the petitioner and on 27th April, 1978 the Slate Government passed the impugned order staring that after taking into consideration the explanation furnished by the petitioner, the State Government was of the opinion that the continuance of the petitioner as a Councillor was not desirable in the interest of the public and the Council. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner has filed this petition.

( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, the impugned order was assailed on the ground that the said order was not a speaking order and hence it deserved to be quashed on that ground alone. It was further urged that some of the allegations mentioned in the charge-sheet were admitted to be factually incorrect, and hence it was not possible to infer on what charges the State Government had passed the impugned order and the said order, the