High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
DIPAK MISRA, S. K. KULSHRESTHA, KRISHNA KUMAR LAHOTI
LAXMINARAYAN - Appellant
Versus
SHIVLAL GUJAR - Respondents
L. P. A. 461 Of 2000
Decided On : 10/03/2002
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL - SUBJECT - SECTION 100-A OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 (IN SHORT 'THE CODE') - SUMMARY: Whether by substitution of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') the Legislature by taking recourse to dexterous method has completely obfuscated the rights of a litigant to maintain a Letters Patent Appeal in invocation of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree or order passed by a learned single Judge from an original appellate decree or order or still there is some arena which is saved, being unaffected.
Fact of the Case:
In L. P. A. No. 461/2000 defensibility of the judgment and decree dated 19-6-2000 passed by a learned single Judge in the First Appeal No. 50/96 affirming the judgment and decree dated 8-1-1996 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad was called in question. When the said appeal was listed for hearing, Mr. Divesh Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 placing reliance on the amended provision i. e. Section 100-A of the Code that has been brought on the statute book by The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 (in short 'the Amending Act') and the decision rendered by a Division Bench in L. P. A. No. 31/91 (Sachish Chandra Jain v. Shri Bhagwan) since reported in 2002 (2) MPJR 138 : 2002 (3) MPLJ 504, raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable and deserved to be dismissed on that score. The Division Bench hearing the matter thought it apposite that the decision rendered in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) required consideration by a larger Bench.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the Letters Patent Appeal is a vested right and can only be abrogated either by express language or by necessary implication. The Court further held that Section 100-A of the Code is prospective to the extent that no appeal which is covered within the ambit and sweep of the language used under Section 100-A of the Code would lie after 1-7-2002. However, the Court also held that pending appeals preferred prior to the cut-off date would be heard on merits having remained unaffected by substitution of Section 100-A of the Code.
Issues: 1. Whether the substitution of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') has completely obfuscated the rights of a litigant to maintain a Letters Patent Appeal in invocation of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree or order passed by a learned single Judge from an original appellate decree or order? 2. Whether there is any arena which is saved, being unaffected by the substitution of Section 100-A of the Code?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the Letters Patent Appeal is a vested right and can only be abrogated either by express language or by necessary implication. 2. The Court further held that Section 100-A of the Code is prospective to the extent that no appeal which is covered within the ambit and sweep of the language used under Section 100-A of the Code would lie after 1-7-2002. 3. However, the Court also held that pending appeals preferred prior to the cut-off date would be heard on merits having remained unaffected by substitution of Section 100-A of the Code.
Final Decision: The Court held that the law laid down in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) that substitution of Section 100-A of the Code affects the Letter Patent Appeals which have been preferred prior to 1-7-2002 and are pending for adjudication and hence, not maintainable, does not correctly state the law and we reiterate that pending appeals preferred prior to the cut-off date would be heard on merits having remained unaffected by substitution of Section 100-A of the Code.
( 1 ) THE term 'law' is applied and taken recourse to herald the incandescent attributes of civilisation with stupendous felicity and the advancement of society is conditioned by the appropriate legal evolution. Sometimes the law is conceived as 'jus naturale', at times as 'jus civile' and some other times it is equated with 'jus honorarium'. But the term 'jus' is always important. 'jus' should never succumb to 'joss'. That is why it has been said that the law is not the study of words alone but a penetration into the study of nature within and nature without which are projected through words that have the moving power of life. For that Simon pure reason William Shakespeare spoke: The Law hath not been dead, though it hath slept. " We have embarked upon the subject with the aforesaid prefatory note as our essay and venture is to find out whether by substitution of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') the Legislature by taking recourse to dexterous method has completely obfuscated the rights of a litigant to maintain a Letters Patent Appeal in invocation of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree or order passed by a learned single Judge from an original appellate decree or order or still there is some arena which is saved, being unaffected. In this setting, we are obliged to cogitate to find out the legitimate and purposive acceptation of the provision in question. ( 2 ) BEFORE we enter into the spectrum of rumination we think it seemly to exposit briefly the factual context in regard to travelling of the matter to a larger Bench. In L. P. A. No. 461/2000 defensibility of the judgment and decree dated 19-6-2000 passed by a learned single Judge in the First Appeal No. 50/96 affirming the judgment and decree dated 8-1-1996 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad was called in question. When the said appeal was listed for hearing, Mr. Divesh Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 placing reliance on the amended provision i. e. Section 100-A of the Code that has been brought on the statute book by The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 (in short 'the Amending Act') and the decision rendered by a Division Bench in L. P. A. No. 31/91 (Sachish Chandra Jain v. Shri Bhagwan) since reported in 2002 (2) MPJR 138 : 2002 (3) MPLJ 504, raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable and deserved to be dismissed on that score. The Division Bench hearing the matter thought it apposite that the decision rendered in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) required consideration by a larger Bench. It is appropriate to state here that in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) the Division Bench had dismissed the L. P. A. pending for more than a decade before this Court as not maintainable. In this factual backdrop the matter has been referred to the larger Bench and is before us.
( 3 ) THE cardinal issue that arises for studied deliberation is whether by introduction of Section 100-A of the Code which has come into effect on 1-7-2002 atrophies the pending appeals preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and also effaces the right of filing such appeals after the said cut-off date or the amendment does not guillotine the pending appeals prior to coming of the aforesaid provision but does decimate and nullify the right of such preferring of appeal after the said provision brought on the statute book.
( 4 ) MR. N. S. Kale, learned Senior Counsel being assisted by Mr. G. Mukhopadhyay for the appellant assiduously contended that the decision rendered in the case of Sachish Chandra Jain (supra) does not correctly lay down the law inasmuch as it has held that an appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, Appeal being an intra-Court appeal, is not an appeal as is ordinarily understood and, therefore, is not a vested right though an appeal preferred in aid of the Letters Patent is ma
Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin
Smt. Annapurna Devi v. Akbar Patel
Lal Ragho Shah v. State of M.P.
Lakshmi Narain v. First Addl. District Judge, Allahabad
M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner
D. R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner
Shiv Kripal Singh v. V. V. Giri
Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhry
King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji
Union of India v. Elphinstone Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd.
F. S. Gandhi v. Commr. of Wealth Tax, 1990 3 SCC 624 Babulal v. Ramesh Babu Gupta
Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India
Arul Nadar v. Authorised Officer Land Reforms
Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh
Ganapat Giri v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, Balia
Haryana Financial Corporation v. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills
Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India
Sachish Chandra Jain v. Shri Bhagwan
Harshad S. Mehta v. State of Maharashtra
Jagdish Chandra Patnaik v. State of Orissa
R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandra-shekharan
Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat
Referred to : Shesh Kumar Pradhan v. Kesheo Narayan Aghariya
Referred to : P. Nirathilengam v. Annaya Madar
General Manager, Northern Railway v. Sarvesh Chopra
P. V. Hemalatha v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.