The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Additional District Judge has the jurisdiction to hear objections raised under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, based on the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions and precedents.

DIPAK MISRA, J. :- The spinal and centroidal issue that has spiralled to this Court for the purpose of adjudication in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India is whether the Additional District Judge has the inherent jurisdiction to hear the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the 1996 Act') in view of the language employed under Sections 2(1)(e) and 42 of the said enactment or it is the District Judge alone who has the jurisdiction to deal with the lis.

2. The facts which are absolutely imperative to be exposited for the purpose of adjudication of the controversy are that four agreements were signed between the petitioners, namely, Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board and Madhya Pradesh Power Generation Company Limited and the respondents on the basis of a letter of intent issued in favour of the respondent No. 1 on 11-5-1999. In pursuance of the execution of the agreement, the respondent No. 1 had submitted the bank guarantees for obtaining advance payment and accordingly, a letter of credit was issued. As some disputes arose, the petitioners encashed the bank guarantees of the respondent No. 1. Because of the said action, the respondent No. 1 preferred an application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur who directed the petitioner No. 1 not to disburse the amount of bank guarantee and keep it secured. The respondent No. 1 initiated certain proceedings in the Court of Geneva, Italy against the invocation of the bank guarantees and the said Court, by order dated 12-11-2001, held that no fault can be found with the action of the petitioner No. 1 for invoking the bank guarantees. As pleaded, dispute emerged in filing of an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act by the respondent No. 1 and eventually on 25-2-2002, the Apex Court appointed three retired Judges of the Supreme Court as the Arbitral Tribunal. After submission of respective statements of claim, written statements and counterclaim, the Arbitral Tribunal, by order dated 23-9-2004, allowed the claim of the respondent No. 1 in part and dismissed the counter-claim preferred by the petitioner No. 1. Being dissatisfied with the said award the petitioner No. 1 preferred an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the learned District Judge, Jabalpur who transferred the matter for adjudication to the IXth Additional District Judge. Before the said Court, the petitioners filed an application that the District Judge alone is the Principal City Court of the District as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act and hence, he alone is entitled and empowered to hear the matter and the Additional District Judge did not have the jurisdiction to dwell upon the lis. The learned Additional District Judge, by order dated 4-7-2008, rejected the application preferred by the petitioner as per Annexure-P-5.

3. Be it noted, certain applications have been made in the petition with regard to the provisions contained in the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 (for short 'the 1958 Act') and how the said Act has been substituted by M. P. Act No. 7 of 1980 with retrospective effect. Reference has been made to the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940 and how the provisions therein are quite different from the provisions contained in the 1996 Act. It is urged that the provisions contained in the 1958 Act are in conflict with the 1996 Act and hence, are unconstitutional.

4. Mr. R. N. Singh, learned Advocate General, assailing the order impugned in the backdrop of jurisdiction has raised the following contentions :-

(a) The definition of the term "court" as per Section 2(1)(e) includes the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction of the District and does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes and hence, the Additional District Judge not being the Principal Ci