The main legal point established in the judgment is that the nature of the agreement, as well as the intention of the parties, must be considered to determine the appropriate legal framework for resolving disputes. The Court emphasized the importance of interpreting commercial documents in a manner understood in commercial parlance and relied on previous legal precedents to support its decision.

JUDGMENT

Alok Aradhe, J.

1. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, inter alia, seek quashment of the order dated 19-2-2013 passed by the Trial Court, by which the application under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short "the 1996 Act") filed by respondent No. 1 seeking termination of mandate of Arbitral Tribunal, has been allowed. The background facts, leading to filing of this petition, briefly stated, are that the petitioner No. 1 is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent No. 1 invited the tender for construction of Sagar-Damoh-Jabalpur road. The tender submitted by the petitioner No. 1 was accepted and concession agreement dated 11-4-2003 was entered into between the petitioner No. 1 and the respondent No. 1 with regard to construction and maintenance of Sagar-Damoh-Jabalpur road on BOT basis. Thereafter, the petitioner, respondent No. 1 and the Government of Madhya Pradesh entered into a State Support Agreement on 14-4-2003 under which State Government guaranteed the implementation of terms and conditions of the concession agreement by respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 vide letter dated 12-7-2007 rescinded the contract under Clause 32.2 of the concession agreement on the ground that the petitioner could not complete the work within the stipulated time. Clause 39 of the concession agreement provides for settlement of the dispute through arbitration under the 1996 Act. After protracted correspondence, the petitioner appointed Mr. R.C. Chugh as an Arbitrator under Clause 39 of the concession agreement whereas the respondent No. 1 appointed one Mr. K. Shankar Narayanan as an Arbitrator vide letter dated 9-3-2011. The two nominated Arbitrators appointed Mr. K.K. Sethi as Presiding Arbitrator in the meeting of the Arbitrators which was held on 5-4-2011.

2. The petitioner filed the statement of claim before the Arbitrator on 16-7-2011. The respondent No. 1 raised a preliminary objection under Section 16 of the 1996 Act on the ground of limitation and for not exhausting the procedure for amicable settlement prescribed in the agreement. The respondent No. 1 also filed statement of defence and counter-claim before the Arbitral Tribunal. The matter was heard by Arbitral Tribunal on 23rd, 24th and 25th June, 2012. The respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act in which challenge to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal was made on the ground that the dispute between the parties has to be adjudicated under the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1983 Act") and not under the 1996 Act. The Arbitral Tribunal by order dated 25-6-2012 rejected the application submitted by the respondent No. 1 under Section 16 of the 1996 Act and determined the Rules of procedure of arbitration.

3. The respondent No. 1 thereafter filed an application under Section 14 of the 1996 Act before the District Judge, Bhopal on the ground that Arbitral Tribunal has become de jure and is unable to perform its function. The Trial Court vide order dated 27-6-2012 granted interim stay of the proceeding before the Arbitral Tribunal. The petitioner filed reply to the application for stay. The Trial Court vide order dated 28-7-2012 after hearing the parties vacated the ad interim order of stay. The respondent No. 1 in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenged the order dated 28-7-2012 passed by the Trial Court. The writ petition was disposed of by a Bench of this Court on 3-10-2012 with the direction to the Trial Court to expeditiously decide the arbitration case pending before it. Thereafter, the Trial Court vide order dated 19-2-2013 inter alia held that a works contract cannot be termed as a concession agreement merely because the mode of payment has been changed. It was further held that the proceeding under the 1996 Act is invalid and the dispute between