2018 Supreme(MP) 113
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
Hemant Gupta, J.
M/s Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited - Petitioner
Vs.
Northern Coal Field Limited - Respondent
Arbitration Case No. 56 of 2016
Decided On : 11-01-2018
For the Petitioner:Shri Vinod Kumar Dubey, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Shri Greeshm Jain, Advocate.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the cause of arbitration, the accrual of the right to apply for arbitration, and the exclusion of the notice period in determining the period of limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator.
Headnote:
Arbitration - Appointment of Arbitrator - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 21, Section 43 - The court discussed the provisions of Section 21 and 43 of the Act, and the relevant sections of the Limitation Act, 1963. The key legal provisions interpreted by the court include the commencement of arbitral proceedings, application of the Limitation Act to arbitrations, and the period of limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator. The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of the cause of arbitration, the accrual of the right to apply for arbitration, and the exclusion of the notice period in determining the period of limitation.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought appointment of an Arbitrator to refer a dispute arising from an agreement. The respondent objected, claiming the application was barred by limitation under Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Finding of the Court:
The court analyzed the provisions of the Act and the Limitation Act, interpreting the commencement of arbitral proceedings, the application of the Limitation Act to arbitrations, and the period of limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator. The court found that the petitioner's dispute was beyond the period of limitation and thus not arbitrable.
Issues: The issues involved the interpretation of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Limitation Act, 1963, to determine the applicability of the period of limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the cause of arbitration arises when the claimant becomes entitled to raise the question, and the right to apply for cause of arbitration accrues prior to the serving of notice. The court also emphasized that the period of limitation for seeking appointment of an arbitrator must be within three years, excluding the notice period.
Final Decision: The court concluded that the dispute raised by the petitioner was beyond the period of limitation and thus not arbitrable at the instance of the petitioner.
The petitioner seeks appointment of an Arbitrator to refer the dispute arising out of the agreement Annexure P-1.
2. The date of agreement is said to be 18th August, 2010 by the petitioner but in the reply filed, the stand of the respondent is that the said agreement is dated 21st December, 2010. The nature of the said agreement is that of principal letter of allotment under which many agreements were executed by many other parties, but in respect of the petitioner, an agreement was executed on 21st December, 2010 and the petitioner was to execute contract of security coverage at NCL HQ, Nigahi, Khadia, Jayant, Krishnashila and IWSS upto 30th June, 2011.
3. The petitioner served a notice of demand on 29th May, 2013 to seek an appointment of an Arbitrator in terms of agreement between the parties. The Arbitrator was not appointed but the petitioner sought invocation of jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present petition on 20th September, 2016.
4. Mr. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised an objection that the present application filed by the petitioner is barred by limitation. It is argued that in terms of Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to Arbitration proceedings as it applies to proceedings in Court, therefore, it is argued that in terms of Article 137 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Limitation Act’), an application before this Court could be filed only within a period of three years of the date to apply arises, excluding the period of notice required for raising a dispute. Since the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court on 20th September, 2016, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner is barred by limitation.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon Section 21 read with sub-section (2) of Section 43 of the Act to contend that arbitration proceedings will commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. It is, thus, argued that since the petitioner has raised the dispute on 29.05.2013, therefore, the present petition would be deemed to be within the period of limitation.
6. Before the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties are examined, certain provisions of the Act are required to be extracted. Thus, the provisions of Section 21 and 43 of the Act read as under:-
“21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings – Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.”
xxx xxx
“43. Limitations. — (1) The Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court.
(2) For the purposes of this section and the Limitation Act, 1963, an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred in section 21.
(3) Where an arbitration agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration provides that any claim to which the agreement applies shall be barred unless some step to commence arbitral proceedings is taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to which the agreement applies, the Court, if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused, and notwithstanding that the time so fixed has expired, may on such terms, if any, as the justice of the case may require, extend the time for such period as it thinks proper.
(4) Where the Court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the Court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the dispute so submitted.”
7. The provisions of the Limitation Act a