The main legal point established is the interpretation of the grounds for eviction under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, particularly the bona fide requirement for starting a new business and the need for suitable non-residential accommodation.

JUDGMENT :

Vivek Agarwal, J.

1. This appeal has been filed by the tenant/defendant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 05.09.2018 passed by the learned court of 7th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in F.A. No. 7A/2016, whereby the appellate court has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent setting aside the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2016 passed by the learned court of 9th Civil Judge, Class-2, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 64A/2013, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/landlord was dismissed First appellate court has allowed the suit and passed a decree of eviction against the present appellant

2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that initially plaintiff/respondent had filed a suit for eviction on the grounds of arrears of rent being not paid after 31.5.2011 as were paid on 2.6.2011 despite notice issued by the plaintiff on 9.11.2011 constituting ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the 'Act of 1961') Similarly, a decree of eviction was sought on the ground of nuisance, i.e. under the provisions of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961.

3. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff is not having any other suitable vacant accommodation for carrying out the business of general store and 'Manihan' and therefore he requires space of 500 ft for which suit premises is required and thus canvasing ground of bona fide requirement as envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961, decree was sought

4. It is submitted that learned trial court dismissed the suit recording a finding that none of the grounds as contained in Section 12(1)(a), 12 (1)(c) or 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 are made out seeking eviction of the suit premises being a shop situated on ground floor of municipal plot No. 15/1634, opposite Daud Market, Daulatganj, Lashkar It is submitted that first appellate court overlooked the finding that plaintiffs wife Smt. Meena Garg is already having a business of jewelry and plaintiff is engaged in such business and therefore it cannot be said that he has any bona fide requirement to start a new business of general mercantile goods constituting any ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that plaintiff Shyambabu Garg (P.W. 1) admitted that till 1999 his father was looking after the business of jewelry at Topi Bazar and after his death, wife of P.W. 1, Smt. Meena Garg is looking after such business, but it is submitted that the firm namely M/s. Shyam Jewelers is a firm in which plaintiff is looking after the business and just before filing a suit for eviction he obtained a registration certificate in the name of his wife Smt. Meena Garg and such certificate was issued in the year 2011. It is also submitted that plaintiff has not filed any document in relation to firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers from 1999 to 2011 to show that who was the Proprietor and who was looking after business of such firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers. It is pointed out that Smt. Meena Garg (P.W. 2) in cross-examination has admitted that her father-in-law was the Proprietor of the firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers and he died in the year 1999 without leaving any will and therefore without consent of the plaintiff his wife could not have become Proprietor of said firm and in fact a story has been cooked up to get the suit premises vacated specially when Smt. Meena Garg (P.W. 2), admitted in para 18 of cross-examination that she was not having any sales tax registration in the name of the firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers nor was having any registration with the Income Tax Department to show that who was filing income tax returns for such shop after death of her father till the date of she being declared as proprietor.

6. It is also submitted that there are other properties in the name of the plaintiff and such fact having been suppressed in the plaint, plaintiff is not entitled to seek any decree of eviction.

7. Reliance