The main legal point established in the judgment is that the petitioner, as the Managing Director of the Corporation, was not a public servant within the meaning of section 197 of the Code and the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code did not require sanction for prosecution.

JUDGMENT :

R. C. MISHRA, J.

1. This is a petition, under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity 'the Code'), for having the order-dated 23-3-2010 passed by Special Judge (under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) (hereinafter referred to as 'PC Act') at Bhopal in Special Case No. 1/08 rejecting the applications made by the petitioner for discharge nullified and also for quashing of the charge-sheet, so far as it relates to him.

2. In that case, cognizance of the offences punishable under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been taken against the petitioner, a superannuated officer of Indian Administrative Service, and co-accused Narsingh Mandal and Prakash Chand Sethi who, at the relevant point of time, were respectively Chairman and Deputy General Manager (Store and Purchase) of M. P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation").

3. Relevant allegations, as contained in the charge-sheet, may be summarized as under -

(i) During his tenure from 28-2-1995 to 26-4-1997, in contravention of the decision of the Head Quarter Tendering Committee, the petitioner, by abusing his position of the Managing Director of the Corporation, issued -

(a) Order for procurement of 100 chassis manufactured by TELCO (Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd.) for being converted into motorbuses.

(b) Order for construction of the corresponding bus bodies by Automobile Corporation Goa Limited (for short "ACGL") without inviting any tender for the work and despite the fact that the Corporation had its own workshops at Gwalior and Indore.

(ii) However, ultimately, 28 bus-bodies were built by ACGL and the entire transaction resulted into a wrongful loss of a sum of Rs. 35,24,000/- to the Corporation.

4. The first application for discharge was moved on the ground that no cognizance of the offence under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code could be taken in absence of sanction, under section 197 of the Code, for prosecution of the petitioner as well as co-accused Narsingh Mandal in view of the fact that none of them was removable from corresponding offices save by or with the sanction of the respective Government. However, even before the objection could be decided, the petitioner submitted another application for discharge on the premise that his prosecution was also violative of Rule 6(1)(c) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits), Rules, 1958.

5. Learned Senior Counsel has strenuously contended that the order under challenge is not sustainable in view of the following undisputed facts -

(i) The Corporation is a statutory body established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (for brevity 'the Act of 1950') and by virtue of section 14 thereof, power to appoint or to remove a Managing Director of the Corporation vests in the State Government.

(ii) He stood superannuated from the service on 31-12-2007 whereas the charge-sheet relating to the offences allegedly committed on or about 20-11-1995, was filed on 1-1-2008.

According to him, sanction for prosecution of the petitioner in respect of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was necessary simply because while discharging functions as the Managing Director of the Corporation, he had acted as a public servant, defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and removable from the post by the State Government only. He has further submitted that the prosecution was also barred by limitation as the period of four years prescribed by Rule 6 (ibid) had already expired before filing of the charge-sheet.

In response, learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted that none of the contentions raised by the petitioner necessitates any interference with his legitimate prosecution.

6. A bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the objection based on Rule 6(1)(c) was overruled in the light of decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab