2015 Supreme(Tri) 255
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA
U.B. SAHA and S. TALAPATRA, JJ.
Dulal Shil – Appellant
Versus
Dali Shil – Respondents
MAT APP. No. 15 of 2014
Decided On : 06.05.2015
Act Referred
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.134(1)(c), Art.133(1)(a), Art.133(1)(b), Art.133(1)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.397, S.397(2)
FAMILY COURTS ACT : S.19(1), S.19(5), S.19(2), S.19(3), S.19(4), S.19(6)
HINDU MARRIAGE ACT : S.24, S.25, S.26, S.27
Advocate Appeared:
For the appellant :Mr. A. Bhowmik, Advocate.
For the respondent:Ms. K. Roy, Advocate.
S. Talapatra, J.
Having questioned the legality of the order dated 10.07.2014 directing payment of maintenance pendentelite and expenses of the proceeding in Misc. 26 of 2014, related to the Title Suit (Divorce) 410 of 2013 delivered by the Judge, Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura, this appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 has been preferred by the petitioner who instituted the suit seeking dissolution of marriage by decree. The respondent herein, in the Title Suit (Divorce) 410 of 2014, filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for provisioning maintenance pendentelite and the expenses of the proceeding. By the order dated 10.07.2014, the petitioner has been directed to pay the respondent a sum of Rs.5,000/by the next date and to provide maintenance @Rs.3,000/per month w.e.f. 01.07.2014 till disposal of the Title Suit (Divorce) 410 of 2013. It has been further directed that the remittance be made by the money order within 10th day of every English calendar month. The petitioner shall also bear the charge for money order. The petitioner however has been given liberty to remit in the bank account of the respondent, if the details are furnished later on.
[2] The respondent has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 contending that the impugned order is an interlocutory order and against an interlocutory order neither an appeal under Section 19(1) nor any revision can be carried out in view of Section 19(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
As agreed by the counsel, this Court has decided that the question of maintainability would be heard along with the merit in the appeal and in the event it is held for any reason that appeal is maintainable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the appeal would be decided on merit. Hence, by the order dated 14.01.2015 we called for the records.
[3] Ms. K. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has taken us to the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 to contend that appeal shall lie from ‘every judgment or order’ not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. For purpose of reference, Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is reproduced hereunder:
Section 19. Appeals: (1) Save as provided in subsection (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, c1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974) or in any other law, an appal shall lie form every judgment and order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.
[4] Section 19(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides that no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court except as provided in subsections (1)& (4) subject to subsections (2 )& (3) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Ms. Roy, learned counsel has submitted that the impugned order is an interlocutory order as it has not determined the rights of the parties finally. It is an interim order till disposal of the suit. Thus, no appeal from the order being an interlocutory order shall lie. Hence, this appeal be shot down at the threshold.
[5] From the other side, Mr. A. Bhowmik, learned counsel appearing for the appellant while responding to the objection as to maintainability of the appeal has submitted that Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 has accommodated a provision for appeal against every judgment or order. An order can also be a judgment within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the C.P.C. which provides that “‘judgment’ means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order.” He has further contended that the order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot be termed as interlocutory order inasmuch as what is decided under Section 24 of the Hindu Ma