IMPORTANT POINT
Divorce – Cruelty by husband – A woman will forgive and condone to protect her matrimonial union and family but there is always a limit to what a woman can endure.

JUDGMENT

Devan Ramachandran, J.—This case lays bare the searing plight of a woman, forced to endure an unhappy marriage, characterized by violence - both physical and mental.

2. The appellant - husband is before us, challenging the judgment of the learned Family Court, Malappuram, which allowed OP No.251/2021-filed by the respondent - wife seeking divorce – finding him to have treated the latter with abject cruelty.

3. The respondent, in her pleadings, recounted her misery, stating that her marriage with the appellant was solemnized on 29.01.2006 in accordance with the Christian rites. She says that, though two children were born in their union, she had been continuously treated with cruelty by the appellant and that she had even suffered grievous injuries and wounds in some of those episodes. She says that she was thus pushed to the wall – in a manner of speaking - particularly when she was physically assaulted on 03.12.2012 - which required the Police to intervene and rescue her – compelling her to file a complaint against the appellant as C.C.No.544/2012, which, however, ended in his acquittal because she resiled from her stand solely to protect him, as also his employment as a Higher Secondary School Teacher. She alleged that, however, the situation turned to the worse and that she, therefore, filed an application for divorce against the appellant, numbered as OP No.999/2013; but that it was withdrawn by her under the hortative hope that he would mend his ways.

4. The respondent submits that since it did not so happen, she filed another Original Petition for divorce, namely OP No.198/2016, which was also dismissed for default, since she chose not to prosecute it, again for the same reason afore; but that this emboldened the appellant to further instances of assault – evident from Ext.A9 discharge summary, relating to an injury which she sustained when she was hit on the head by him with an iron rod. She admits that she did not press charges in this incident either; but that the scenario became far worse, which led to Crime No.717/2020, as also Crime No.259/2022, being forced to be registered against him, invoking various provisions, including Sections 447, 451, 427, 324 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). She says that, therefore, she was left without any other option but to file the present Original Petition, seeking divorce.

5. In response, the appellant erected defence before the learned Trial Court that he had been acquitted in all the earlier cases filed against him and that he is suffering from issues of “anger management”, which he sought to prove through Ext.B1, being a prescription issued by his doctor on 07.05.2022.

6. However, the learned Family Court found– in our view correctly – that Ext.B1 carries no worth since the doctor had not been even cited as a witness or examined; and further that the admitted Crimes subsequently registered against the appellant, after the earlier ones had been acquitted or withdrawn or dismissed as not being pressed, would establish that he was treating the respondent with grave cruelty consistently. It thus allowed the petition and granted divorce under the provisions of Section 10(1)(X) of the Divorce Act, 1869 (‘Act’ for short).

7. As said above, the appellant challenges the findings and the order of the learned Family Court as being untenable and illegal.

8. We have heard Sri.John Joseph Vettikad – learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. K. Rakesh – learned counsel for the respondent.

9. Sri.John Joseph Vettikad argued the matter on its merits and then digressed to inform us that his client is also concerned about the well-being of his children. He submitted that his client is now sincerely contrite for what he had done in the past and that he wants to live with his family again, especially because the children are in their most formative age.

10. Sri.John Joseph Vettikad then contended that the evidence on record would not be sufficient to prove cruelty as statutorily re