ORDER :

Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

Heard Ms. P. Hamsa Durga, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Maruthi Jadhav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of M/s. Pearl Law Associates for the respondent No. 1 - State Bank of India.

2. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the legality and validity of the docket order dated 06.10.2021 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal - I at Hyderabad (Tribunal) dismissing I.A. No. 404 of 2020 filed by the petitioner in O.A. No. 587 of 2019.

3. Though not specifically pleaded, it can be gathered from the pleadings and other materials on record that petitioners had availed loan from respondent No. 1 - State Bank of India, but defaulted in repayment of the same. For recovery of the loan amount, respondent No. 1 - State Bank of India filed the original application before the Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which has been registered as O.A. No. 587 of 2019, wherein petitioner No. 1 herein has been arrayed as the respondent.

3.1 It further appears that petitioner No. 1 failed to file the written statement not only within the thirty days period of limitation, but also within the extended period of limitation of further fifteen days, where-after, the Tribunal passed an order dated 30.01.2020 foreclosing filing of written statement by the respondent (petitioner No. 1) and directing that O.A. No. 587 of 2019 shall proceed ex parte against the respondent.

3.2 For recalling the aforesaid ex parte order, respondent (Petitioner No.1) filed an interlocutory application before the Tribunal, which was registered as I.A. No.404 of 2020.

3.3 By the impugned docket order dated 06.10.2021, Tribunal dismissed the interlocutory application holding that it has no power to extend the time line for filing of the written statement beyond forty five days. However, it was clarified that respondent (petitioner No.1) could participate in the proceedings of O.A.No.587 of 2019, and advance arguments.

3.4 It is this order which has been challenged in the present proceeding.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the interlocutory application of the petitioner. She submits that though under Section 19(5) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), since rechristened as Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (briefly ‘the 1993 Act’ hereinafter) there is a time limit of thirty days in filing of written statement by the defendant, which is extendable for a further period of fifteen days, Section 22 of the said Act clarifies that the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal would not be bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice.

4.1 According to her, principles of natural justice mandates that a reasonable opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the defendant, which includes filing of written statement, even if necessary, by relaxing the period of limitation.

4.2 Therefore the Tribunal was not justified in foreclosing filing of written statement by the respondent holding that it did not have the competence to condone the delay beyond the extended period of limitation.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the time line provided under Section 19(5) of the 1993 Act is required to be adhered to strictly. Legislative intent is very clear. Initially thirty days time is provided to the defendant to file written statement and for exceptional circumstances, the said period of thirty days can be extended by a further period, not exceeding fifteen days. In all, defendant has time of forty five days to file the written statement. Beyond that, there is no provision extending the limitation for filing written statement. Therefore, view taken by the Tribunal is correct and no interference is called for.

5.1 In support of his submissions le