JUDGMENT:

(Ujjal Bhuyan, J.)

1. Heard Mr. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Ms. Sangeeta Bhaskar, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. S.Lakshmi Kanth, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. This intra-court appeal has been preferred by the Gas Authority of India Limited (for short, ‘GAIL’) and its officials as the appellants against the judgment and order dated 16.03.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing W.P.No.26030 of 2017 filed by the respondent as the writ petitioner.

3. Respondent had filed the related writ petition assailing the following orders:

i) suspension order dated 06.07.2016;

ii) report of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) dated 20.01.2017;

iii) order of penalty dated 24.03.2017;

iv) appellate order dated 29.06.2017 dismissing the appeal of the respondent against the order of penalty; and

v) gratuity forfeiture order dated 17.05.2017.

3.1. We may briefly mention that respondent was an officer of GAIL and on the allegation of committing sexual harassment on three contractual women employees of GAIL was first suspended and following enquiry by the ICC was imposed the penalty of removal from service besides forfeiture of his gratuity.

4. Learned Single Judge vide the judgment and order dated 16.03.2021 allowed the writ petition by holding that appellants have not followed the mandate of Rule 30 of the GAIL Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1986 (briefly, ‘the Rules’ hereinafter), which is a substantive legal requirement while imposing the major penalty of removal from service. Learned Single Judge held that appellants have not initiated any disciplinary proceedings in terms of Rule 30 of the Rules against the respondent and in the absence of the same, question of treating the report of ICC as a disciplinary proceeding would not arise. Consequently, the order of penalty of removal from service dated 24.03.2017 as well as the appellate order dated 29.06.2017 have been set aside. However, liberty has been given to the appellants to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent in accordance with the provisions of the Rules.

5. Assailing the above finding rendered by the learned Single Judge, Mr. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that the said judgment and order is wholly unsustainable on facts as well as in law. Learned Single Judge has misconstrued the report of the ICC as a preliminary or fact-finding enquiry report and therefore, erroneously proceeded that based on such report of ICC, appellants were required to initiate further proceedings under Rule 30 of the Rules. The same having not been done, learned Single Judge interfered with the order of penalty. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241, whereby and whereunder Supreme Court had issued a series of guidelines in view of the legislative vacuum dealing with sexual harassment of women at work place. He has referred to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297, wherein Supreme Court while lamenting the lethargy of the authority in putting in place a comprehensive legislation dealing with sexual harassment of women at work place despite fifteen long years having passed following the decision in Vishaka (supra) clarified that report of the ICC would be deemed to be an enquiry report in a disciplinary action under the civil service conduct rules. In other words, the disciplinary authority is required to treat the report of the ICC as the finding in a disciplinary enquiry against a delinquent employee and act on such report. Therefore, there was no requirement in law to hold additional proceedings under Rule 30 of the Rules on the basis of the ICC report.

5.1. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that after the ICC report was submitted, the d