IMPORTANT POINT
The determination of whether the essential ingredients of the offenses under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC are made out can only be decided after a full-fledged trial.

JUDGMENT

1. This revision is filed against the order dtd. 2/1/2023 in Crl.MP.No.1295 of 2019 in C.C.No.4812 of 2018 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court-cum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar.

2. Heard Sri Jalli Kanakaiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri S. Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1.

3. The petitioner was arrayed as accused in C.C.No.4812 of 2018 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Ranga Reddy at L.B.Nagar, for the offences punishable under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. He filed Crl.MP.No.1295 of 2019 seeking for his discharge from the said case, which is dismissed by way of impugned order dtd. 2/1/2023.

4. The facts of the case in brief, are that one B. Satyanarayana, Sub-Inspector of Police, Chaitanyapuri Police Station has filed a complaint against the petitioner on 8/8/2015 alleging that on the said date, the petitioner has obstructed him from discharging his official duties and also threatened him. Therefore, a case was registered for the offences punishable under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC.

5. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner that the ingredients of Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC are not made out from the complaint and even the 161 Cr.P.C. statement of the de facto complainant does not disclose the elements of assault or criminal force, and therefore, prayed to discharge the petitioner from the alleged offences under Ss. 353 and 506 of IPC. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the following judgments :

1. In Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka and another,2015 LawSuit (SC) 52. wherein, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under :

"The essential ingredients of the offence under Sec. 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Sec. 353 IPC are not made out. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this Sec. . But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty."

2. In Manoj v. State of Kerala,Crl.MC.No.4290 of 2019, dt.23/11/2021. wherein, it is held by the Kerala High Court as under:

The Explanation to Sec. 351 itself will be an answer to it because it would say specifically that "Mere words do not amount to an assault." But if at all the words gave any gestures or preparation, it may make those gestures or preparation amount to an assault. But words alleged in the FIS does not speak about any gestures or any preparation to make those gestures amounting to assault. So the alleged assault are quite short of attracting the offence under Sec. 353 so as to amount to assault or use of criminal force......However, the question remains is only whether the alleged acts of the petit