Point of Law: There was no time-limit prescribed within which prosecution had to be instituted - When there was no such limit prescribed then there was no valid reason for holding period of 45 days as mandatory

ORDER :

B. Vijaysen Reddy, J.

The relief sought for in the writ petition is as follows :

“…the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an order more particularly Writ of Mandamus declaring the noncompliance of Sections 38(7), 49(1) and 52 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 by the Respondents No.3 and 4 in their day to day functioning as illegal and amounts to flouting of the Provisions of the Act and defeating the object of the Act and consequently direct the Respondents No.3 and 4 to dispose of CC.No.8/19 and FA.No.8/2020 respectively pending on their respective filed duly adhering to the aforesaid provisions of the Act for better protection to the Consumers and pass such other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstance of the case.”

2. Petitioner submits that he filed CC.No.8 of 2019 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hyderabad (for short ‘the State Commission’) in the year 2019. The said case is coming for evidence of the opposite party. In the meantime, an order dated 27.11.2019 was passed in IA.No.864 of 2019 in CC.No.8 of 2019 against the Opposite Party No.2. Aggrieved by the said order, the Opposite Party No.2 filed an appeal before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short ‘the National Commission’) on 14.01.2020, FA.No.8 of 2020 and the same is pending.

3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the grievance of the petitioner is that no orders are being passed in CC.No.8 of 2019 and the said case is being adjourned beyond three months. Since January 2020, there is no progress in the case. He further states that there is non-compliance of Sections 38(7), 49(1) and 52 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (for short ‘the Act’) by the State Commission as well as the National Commission, which are expected to dispose of a complaint within a period of three months as per Sections 38(7) and 49(1) of the Act, and an appeal within a period of 90 days as per Section 52 of the Act. Referring to Section 52 of the Act, which stipulates that no adjournment shall ordinarily be granted by the State Commission or the National Commission unless sufficient cause is shown and reasons for grant of adjournment recorded in writing, it is contended that the State Commission and the National Commission are acting in contravention of the provisions of the Act by adjourning the complaint and the appeal respectively, beyond three months, due to which, the matters are being dragged on for years together, thereby frustrating the object and the purpose of the Act.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. On 06.01.2021, when this Court directed the learned counsel for the petitioner to look into the aspect as to whether the time fixed by the Statute is mandatory for disposal of cases in view of any law laid by the Supreme Court, learned counsel for the petitioner had sought time to go through the judgments.

6. When the matter has come up for hearing today, learned counsel for the petitioner states that in spite of his best efforts, he could not trace out any judgments on the aforesaid aspect.

7. The Supreme Court in its recent decision in C. BRIGHT v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, 2020 (6) ALD 214 (SC) has held as under:

7. A well settled rule of interpretation of the statutes is that the use of the word “shall” in a statute, does not necessarily mean that in every case it is mandatory that unless the words of the statute are literally followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. It is not always correct to say that if the word “may” has been used, the statute is only permissive or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid (State of I.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912) and that when a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute