Sinha, C J—I have had the advantage of perusing the opinions recorded by my learned colleagues on this special Bench. After a careful consideration of those opinions I agree entirely with the opinion recorded by my brother Hidayatullah J. As I agree with his conclusions for the reasons given by him, I do not think it necessary to record a separate opinion.

2. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ or order of certiorari to quash the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Akola, passed in appeal in a proceeding under the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949.

3. The Petitioner Bhailal Jagdish applied to the Rent Controller, Akola, for permission to terminate the tenancy of the second non-applicant at the end of the five years for which the tenancy stood, on the ground that the land was seeded by him for his business of a coal-dealer. The second non-applicant expressed a desire, to continue the lease on the same terms and conditions as before (as per Clause 13(i)(b) of the Control Order) and also contested that the Petitioner needed the premises to start a bona tide or genuine business. The contentions of the second non-applicant were accepted by the Rent Controller & on appeal by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, the application was dismissed. It was in these circumstances that this petition was filed.

4. This matter was originally before the Chief Justice and Mudholkar J. but it was referred to this Full Bench because a doubt appears to have arisen about the. extent of the powers of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In - Sagatmal v. Additional Deputy Commr.,1951 ILR(Nag) 769, to which I was a party, it was laid down that the power to issue a writ, of certiorari is not equal to an appeal and that all that this Court can do under Article 226 is to quash the order and return the case for a fresh determination according to law.

5. I have had the advantage of reading an unsigned draft order by my brother Mudholkar J. (as a member of the Division Bench) included in the Paper-book, in which the view in - Sagatmal v. Additional Deputy Commr.,1951 ILR(Nag) 769 is not accepted. According to the learned Judge, it is open to this Court not only to quash such orders but also to substitute its own decision in their place. This view is also shared now by my brother Hemeon J. and I have read his opinion prepared for the consideration of the Full Bench. Since I adhere to my view expressed in - Sagatmal's case' and have the misfortune to disagree with these learned Judges, I proceed to state my opinion separately.

6. The case was argued for the Petitioner by Shri M.N. Phadke and for the first non-applicant by Shri T.P. Naik, Additional Government Pleader. I may state here that the arguments were confined to the point of law about the extent of the powers of the High Court under Article 226. Shri Phadke's argument is that the powers conferred by Article 226 are as wide as one can conceive and that this Court is, in effect, made a Court of appeal and revision against the decisions of all Courts, tribunals, persons, public authorities and in proper cases even Government. Shri Phadke contends that Article 226 confers, to quote him, 'super appellate and revisional jurisdiction' untrammelled by any circumstance or condition; and that the power extends (in addition to the issuing of high prerogative writs) to the issuing of any other writ, order or direction not only for the purpose of enforcing Fundamental Rights but also for 'any other purpose'. Shri Phadke, however, concedes that if his contention that Article 226 gives a 'super appellate and revisional jurisdiction' was not accepted this Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of a subordinate tribunal. But according to him, Article 226 must be read with Article 227 and the visitorial jurisdiction of the High Court involves the consideration of the orders of subordinate tribunal