2004 Supreme(SC) 282

2004(5) Supreme 328
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Calcutta High Court)
Shivaraj V. Patil and D.M. Dharmadhikari, JJ.
Gopal Sardar -Appellant
versus
Karuna Sardar -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 4688 of 1998
With
Civil Appeal No. 444 of 2000
Decided on 9-3-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant in C.A.No. 4688/98 : Shibshankar Sarkar, Sr. Advocate, Pradyot Kumar Chakravarty, Advocate.
For the Appellant in C.A.No. 444/2000 : M.N. Krishnamani, Sr. Advocate, Abhijit Sengupta, Anant De, G. Venkatesh, Pijush Kharua, Advocates.
For the Respondent in C.A.No. 4688/98 : Raja Chatterjee and G.S. Chatterjee, Advocates.
For the Respondent in C.A.No. 444/2000 : Ranjit Kumar S.B. Sanyal, Sr. Advocates, Pijush K. Roy, Dipankar Datta, Pranab Kumar Mullick, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service in aid of a belated application made under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, seeking condonation of delay.

Headnote:West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955-Section 8-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Claim of right of pre-emption-Belated application-Inapplicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay-Respondent filed an application u/s 8 of the Act claiming right of pre-emption on basis of vicinage being the owner of adjoining plots of land-It is her case that she came to know on 18-9-1985 that appellant had purchased the said plot on 17-8-1979, which is adjoining the respondent s plot-Application filed by respondent held barred by time-High Court upheld the order passed by the Munsif Court condoning the delay for making the application-Appeal against-Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application made u/s 8 of the Act-(No).

       Held : The Act is a self-contained Code inasmuch as the Act provides to enforce the rights of pre-emption, forum is provided, procedure is prescribed, remedies including the appeals and revisions are provided, penalties are indicated for non-compliance of the orders and powers are given for restoration of land. Further period of limitation is also specifically prescribed to make an application under Section 8 of the Act and for preferring appeals or revisions under the provisions of the Act. All these and few other provisions are clear enough to indicate that the Act is a complete Code in itself dealing with the rights of pre-emption. Second proviso to Section 14H specifically provides for the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of preferring an appeal or revision. Section 14-O(1) specifically enables the appellate authority to allow to prefer an appeal even after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed on showing sufficient cause. Similarly second proviso to Section 19(2) of the Act expressly provides for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal to be preferred under the said Section. Section 51A of the Act deals with preparation and revision of record-of-rights. Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Act provides that every appeal under Section 51A of the Act is to be filed within one month from the date of passing of the order appealed against. The proviso to the said Rule states, that an appeal may be admitted after the said period if the appellant satisfies that he had sufficient reasons for not preferring the appeal within the said period. Thus either Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles have been expressly and specifically incorporated in the various Sections afore-mentioned. In contrast although Section 8 of the Act prescribes period of limitation for applying to enforce pre-emption rights, it does not speak of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles. If in the same Act, consciously and expressly, the Legislature has made provision for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles expressly and specifically to other proceedings such as appeal or revision etc. and such a provision is not made for initiation of the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act, it necessarily follows that the Legislature did not intend to give benefit of Section 5 to the Limitation Act having regard to the nature of rights of pre-emption which is considered a weak right. (Para 7)

       We conclude that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service in aid of a belated application made under Section 8 of the Act seeking condonation of delay. The right of pre-emption conferred under Section 8 is a statutory right besides being weak, it has to be exercised strictly in terms of the said Section and consideration of equity has no place. On the facts found in these appeals, applications under Section 8 were not made within four months from the date of transfer but they were made four years and six years after the date of transfer respectively which were hopelessly barred by time. Benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act not being available to the applications made under Section 8, Section 3 of the Limitation Act essentially entails their dismissal. (Para 19)