High Court Of Calcutta
Ruma Pal
SERISH MAJI - Appellant
Versus
NISHIT KUMAR DOLUI - Respondent
C. R. 2345 Of 1996
Decided On : 03/01/1999
RIGHT OF PREEMPTION - LIMITATION ACT - APPLICAITON OF SECTION 5 - APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ACT TO SECTION 8 OF WEST BENGAL LAND REFORMS ACT, 1955 - INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant, claiming a right of preemption as a continuous owner under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (WBLRA), challenged the rejection of his claim by the Munsiff on the ground of limitation and non-applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The issue of conflict in judicial opinions on the applicability of section 5 to section 8 of the WBLRA led to a reference to a Larger Bench.
Finding of the Court:
The Larger Bench, after considering the relevant provisions of the WBLRA, the Limitation Act, and judicial precedents, held that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act do not apply to proceedings under section 8 of the WBLRA.
Issues: 1. Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to proceedings under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (WBLRA). 2. Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act are excluded by the WBLRA being a complete Code.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that the provisions of the Act apply to special or local laws unless expressly excluded. However, the mere provision of a period of limitation in a special or local law is not sufficient to exclude the applicability of section 5. 2. The scheme of the WBLRA shows a clear intention to treat applications under section 8 differently from other proceedings before the Revenue Officer. This is evident from the specific incorporation of section 5 or its principles to other sections of the Act but its omission from section 8. 3. The right of preemption under the WBLRA is a statutory right that must be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 8. An application under section 8 is not an application within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. An application under section 8 initiates an original and independent proceeding before the Munsiff, culminating in a final order that is akin to a decree. Therefore, it is a suit rather than an application under the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The Larger Bench upheld the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under section 8 of the WBLRA, thereby dismissing the revision applications challenging the rejection of preemption claims due to limitation.
( 1 ) THE application before us applied to enforce his right of pre-emption as a continuous owner under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. His prayer was rejected by the Munsiff by an order dated 26th January, 1996 on the ground that the claim was barred by limitation and that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply. The applicant challenged this decision by way of a revisional application. The learned single Judge found that there was a conflict of views on the question whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to proceedings under section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (referred to as the WBLRA ). The matter was referred to a Larger Bench. This Bench has been constituted to resolve the apparent conflict of judicial opinion.
( 2 ) THE two contrary decisions are Chandra Sekhar Sarkar v. Baidyanath Ghosh : AIR 1982 Cal 6 where Guha-J took the view that section 5 applied to applications under section 8 of the WBLRA and Minor Subir Ranjan Mandal v. Sitanath Mukherjee : (1994)1 CLJ 106 where T. Chatterjee-J held that section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to applications under section 8 of the WBLRA.
( 3 ) CHATTERJEE J. distinguished the view of Guha J. in Chandra Sekhar Sarkar v. Baidyanath Ghosh (supra) on the ground that Guha J. had not considered the view of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narayan Yadav v. Lalit Narayan Mishra : (1974)2 SCC 133 nor the scheme of the Act nor the provisions of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Chatterjee J. also said that Guha J had overlooked the decision of Chittatosh Mukherjee J. (as His Lordship then was) in Sm. Ashalata Bairagya v. Gopal Chandra Chakraborty : 1975 (1) CLJ 494 in which it has been held that the statutory right under section 8 had to be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 8.
( 4 ) IN addition Chatterjee-J held that an "application" under section 8 cannot be considered to be an application within section 5 of the Limitation Act. According to Chatterjee-J the application under section 8 must be considered to be in the nature of a plaint field in a suit. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judge noted that by the presentation of the application under section 8 an "original proceeding" was started before the Munsiff just as a plaint initiated proceedings in a suit. He held that the word "suit" used in the Limitation Act should be given a wider meaning so as to include a claim for preemption in whatsoever form it is presented to Court either by plaint or otherwise, whenever a proceeding before the Court commences. Chatterjee-J noted that the Munsiff was clothed with the Special Jurisdiction and exercised powers as a Court. He was conferred with the powers of the Code of Civil Procedure and he also adjudicates the claims finally for preemption and his judgment is enforceable by way of filing an application for execution. The several decisions relied upon by the preemptor were distinguished on the ground that the decisions dealt with different provisions of different Acts and did not consider whether the application for preemption under section 8 of the WBLRA filed before a Munsiff was in the nature of a plaint filed in a suit. On this ground also Chatterjee-J held section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable.
( 5 ) THE learned Judge justified his view denying the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act to section 8 of the WBLRA by stating that the right of preemption had been held by the Supreme Court in Bishen Singh and Ors. v. Khazan Singh and Anr. : AIR 1958 SC 838; Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi : AIR 1960 SC 1368 to be a very weak right and that it could be defeated by all legitimate methods including the ground of limitation. Chatterjee-J accordingly dismissed the several revision applications which had been filed before him as the applications under section 8 of the WBLRA had been made by the preemptor
REFERRED TO : Chandra Sekhar Sarkar v. Baidyanath Ghosh
Minor Subir Ranjan v. Sitanath Mukherjee
Hukumdev Narayan Yadav v. Lalit Narayan Mishra
SM.Ashalata Bairagya v. Gopal Chandra Chakraborty
Bishen Singh and Ors. v. Khazan Singh and Anr.
Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi
Hari Shankar Tripathi v. Shiv Harsh
Anwari Basavaraj Patil v. Siddaramaiah
Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality
Mukri Gopalan v. C.P. Aboobacker
Prof. Sumer Chand v. Union of India
Paresh Nath Mondal v. Bijan Behari Mondal
Smt. Karuna Sardar v. Sri Gopal Sardar
Hansraj v. Dehradun v. Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd.
Pausy Fernandes v. M.F. Queoros
Mst. Puinbasi Majhiani v. Shiba Bhue
SK. Mohammed Rajiq v. Khalilul Rehman
Ramjilal and Ors. v. Ghisaram and Ors.
Prem Singh and Ors. v. Joginder Singh and Ors.
Atamprakash v. State of Haryana
Kerala State Electricity Board Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhalliumma
M/s. Amar Nath Omprakash v. State of Punjab
Gasket Radiators Private Limited v. Employees State Insurance Corporation
The Additional Sprecial Land Acquisition Officer v. Thanboredas
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