Advocates:
K.RAJENDRA CHAUDHARY, M.N.Phadke, M.N.SHROFF, VINA DEVI KHANNA

Key Points: - The judgment discusses whether an order issuing process is a final or interlocutory order and the applicability of the inherent powers and revisional jurisdiction under the 1973 Code (Sections 397(2), 482) (!) (!) (!) . - It reiterates Amar Nath v. State of Haryana regarding limits on Section 482 inherent powers when Section 397(2) bars revision, and clarifies the interpretation of "interlocutory order" in this context (!) (!) (!) . - It analyzes the need to preserve remedies for accused where quashing proceedings may be appropriate, emphasizing that the High Court’s inherent powers are to be sparingly used and not against express legal bars (!) (!) (!) . - It references Mohan Lal case and Mohan Lal’s treatment of orders that conclude inquiries, and whether such orders are final or interlocutory for revisional purposes (!) (!) . - The Court ultimately allows the appeal and remits for disposal on merits, indicating the scope of revisional and inherent powers in these circumstances (!) . - It cites guiding tests distinguishing final vs. interlocutory orders (Kuppuswami Rao et al., Salaman v. Warner) and applies them to the 1973 Code framework (!) (!) (!) (!) . - It emphasizes the need to decide whether absence of jurisdiction or illegality of process justifies quashing, and the limitations under Section 397(2) (!) (!) . - The judgment clarifies that the High Court’s inherent powers may be invoked where there is abuse of process or ends of justice, but not where there is a bar under the statute (!) (!) . - It confirms the availability of a remedy via revision or inherent power to quash when the order is not barred, and that such orders may be revisable if not final under the statutory bar (!) (!) . - The decision references finality tests and cautions against overly strict interpretation of "interlocutory" to prevent defeating revisional remedy (!) (!) .

How to determine whether an order issuing process is a final or interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code?

What is the remedy available to an accused or complainant when a revisional or inherent power challenge is barred by Section 397(2) in the context of quashing criminal proceedings?

What are the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers or revisional jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings after the introduction of the 1973 Code?