IMPORTANT POINTS
1. It cannot be contended that a public servant cannot be proceeded against under Sections 8 and 9 of P.C. Act, 1988. If an accused is a public servant who has ceased to be a public servant and/or is a public servant of different category then no sanction in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act is necessary.
2. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered at the threshold.
3. If the allegations have any substance, an investigation should not be shut out at the threshold merely because a political opponent or a person with political difference raised it and pleaded mala fides.

Headnote:(i) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Section 6 – Sanction – If an accused is a public servant who has ceased to be a public servant and/or is a public servant of different category then no sanction is necessary – Where a criminal act is performed under the colour of authority but which in reality is for the public servant’s own pleasure or benefit then such acts shall not be protected under the doctrine of State immunity – Such cases will attract Section 19(1) which is time and offence related – abuse of office is the test – Section 19(1) is a matter of procedure and does not go to root of jurisdiction. (Paras 3, 21, 22, 25 & 27)
       (ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 468, 471 and 120B – Even offences punishable under Sections 468, 471 and 120B may be relatable to the official duty thereby mandating sanction in terms of Section 197 of Cr. P.C. (Para 4)
       (iii) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Competent authority – deals with authority to grant sanction and not whether sanction is necessary – The authority competent to remove the public servant from the office alleged to have misused is alone the competent sanctioning authority. (Paras 15 and 30)
       (iv) Interpretation of Statues – Legislation must at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a rogue’s charter. (Para 19)
       (v) Constitution of India – Article 141 – Prexcedents as a matter of law – Per incuriam – “Incuria” literally means “carelessness” – In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium – English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis – The “quotable in law” is avoided and ignored if it is rendered “in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority” – Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by Supreme Court – To rectify an error is the compulsion of the judicial conscience. (Para 33)
       (vi) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Sanction – There cannot be any universal rule to determine reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty – The concept of Section 197 does not immediately get attracted on institution of the complaint case –Scope of operation of the Section is restricted to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of, or in purported exercise of, official duty – Once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant – The question relating to the need of sanction is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein – The question of necessity of sanction may have to be determined from stage to stage – The question of absence of sanction can be agitated at the threshold but the alleged invalidity on account of non application of mind is a question which has to be raised during trial. (Paras 37, 41, 42, 47 and 56)
       (vii) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173 – Report u/s 173 purports to be an opinion not requiring elaborate details – the plea that no offence is made out can be urged at the stage of framing charge – Moreover, in view of the specific materials on record, the appellants’ stand that the charge sheet does not refer to any particular material cannot be accepted. (Para 52 and 53)
       (viii) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 13 – If there is material to show that the alleged offence falls in any of the five categories, it is not necessary at the stage of filing of the charge sheet to specify as to which particular clause covers the alleged offence. (Para 54)
       (ix) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 8 and 9 – The expression “whoever” occurring at the beginning of Sections 8 and 9 is very wide and would also cover public servants – Restricting the operation of the sections by confining their ambit to private persons would not reflect the actual legislative intention. (Para 60)
       (x) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Section 5(1)(d) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 161 and 162 – These provisions of the Act and the Code constitute different offences – it would not be permissible to contend that a public servant would be covered by Section 13(1)(d) of 1988 Act (similar to section 5(1)(d) of Old Act) and not by Sections 8 and 9 of the Act – Sections 8 and 9 are much wider. (Para 63 to 65)
       (xi) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 24 – There can be a proceeding against public servant for offence under Sections 7 to 11 which per se includes Sections 8 and 9 – Therefore it cannot be contended that a public servant cannot be proceeded against under Sections 8 and 9.(Para 67)
       (xii) Words and Phrases – Mala fides – Mala fides has not only to be clearly pleaded but specifically proved by adducing cogent evidence – Merely because the political opponent was the complainant that does not per se lead to an inference that the complaint has to be thrown out or that no notice should be taken thereof – If the allegations have any substance, an investigation should not be shut out at the threshold merely because a political opponent or a person with political difference raised it – Therefore, the plea of mala fides as raised cannot be maintained.(Para 68, 69, 79
       (xiii) Constitution of India – Articles 233 and 234 – Not attracted because this is not a case where appointment of persons to be Special Judges or their postings to a particular Special Court is involved – Once group of cases are allocated to Special Court, consequentially other Special Courts cannot deal with them – Use of the aforesaid expression was really un-necessary – Directed to be severable. (Paras 86 and 87)
       Facts of the case:
       (A)Sri Parkash Singh Badal was at the relevant point of time the Chief Minister of the State of Punjab, Smt. Surinder Kaur is his wife and Shri Sukhbir Singh is his son. Smt. Surinder Kaur and Shri Sukhbir Singh Badal allegedly committed offences punishable under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act. Shri Tota Singh, Shri Gurdev Singh Badal, Dr. Ratan Singh Ajnala and Shri Sewa Singh Sekhwan were Ministers during the concerned period and were at the time of taking cognizance members of Legislative Assembly. Shri Sukhbir Singh Badal was a member of the Parliament. All these persons were charged with corruption.
       (B)Proceedings were alleged to have been initiated on the basis of complaints which were lodged mala fide and as an act of political vendetta.
       (C)Charge sheets filed are alleged to be extremely vague and not indicating commission of any definite offence.
       (D)All these cases were registered at Mohali Police Station which was declared to be the police station for the purpose of investigation of the concerned cases.
       (E)Findings of Court: The charge sheet is neither jumbled nor unclear and sanctioning authority applies his mind.
       (F)Plea of mala fides not tenable.
       (G)No infirmity in order of the High Court.

Judgement Key Points

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JUDGMENT

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J. - Leave granted.

2. In each of these appeals challenge is to the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the petition filed by the appellant in each case questioning the validity of proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the ‘Act’) and/or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’). In the latter category of cases the question raised is either lack of sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’) or the legality thereof.

3. It is the stand of the appellant in each case that the proceedings were initiated on the basis of complaints which were lodged mala fide and as an act of political vendetta. It is stated that allegations are vague, lack in details and even if accepted at the face value, did not show the commission of any offence. It is stated that though the High Court primarily relied on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay (1984 (2) SCC 183), the said decision was rendered in the context of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (in short the ‘Old Act’). It is submitted that the provisions contained in Section 6 thereof are in pari materia to Section 19 of the Act so far as relevant for the purpose of this case; the effect of Section 6(2) of the Old Act (corresponding to Section 19(2) of the Act) was lost sight of. The decision in the said case was to the effect that if an accused is a public servant who has ceased to be a public servant and/or is a public servant of different category then no sanction in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act corresponding to Section 6(1) of the Old Act is necessary.

4. So far as the factual scenario of these cases is concerned appellant Sri Parkash Singh Badal was at the relevant point of time the Chief Minister of the State of Punjab, Smt. Surinder Kaur is his wife and Shri Sukhbir Singh is his son. Smt. Surinder Kaur and Shri Sukhbir Singh Badal allegedly committed offences punishable under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act. Shri Tota Singh, Shri Gurdev Singh Badal, Dr. Ratan Singh Ajnala and Shri Sewa Singh Sekhwan were Ministers during the concerned period and were at the time of taking cognizance members of Legislative Assembly. Shri Sukhbir Singh Badal was a member of the Parliament. As noted above, primary stand is that the effect of Section 6(2) of the Old Act corresponding to Section 19 (2) of the Act was not considered and in that view of the matter the judgment in Antulay’s case (supra) is to be considered per incuriam. Additionally, it is submitted that the voluminous charge sheets filed are extremely vague and do not indicate commission of any definite offence. Some allegations of general nature have been made. The decision in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998 (4) SCC 626) specifically dissented from the view regarding vertical hierarchy which appears to be the foundation for the conclusion that the authority competent to remove the accused from office alone could give sanction. It is submitted that the offences alleged to have been committed under IPC had close nexus with the workmen who are on official duty and therefore sanction under Section 197 of the Code is mandatory. With reference to several judgments of this Court it is submitted that even offences punishable under Sections 468, 471 and 120B have been in certain cases held to be relatable to the official duty thereby mandating sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code.

5. It is pointed out that the mala fide intention is clear as all these cases were registered at Mohali Police Station which was declared to be the police station for the purpose of investigation of the concerned cases and new Court was established for the trial of the concerned cases and jurisdiction was conferred on one officer without followng the process of consultation with the High Court. These are indicative of the fact that action was taken with mala fide intention only to haras

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2006 Supreme(SC) 1245

Cases Referred (30)