( 1 ) CONSTITUTIONALITY of a part of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called for the take of brevity "the said Act" for short) is in question in these writ petitions.

( 2 ) THE petitioners are owners of the premises in question. The said premises had originally been leased out to Delhi Improvement Trust by an indenture dated 18th August 1953. The said leasehold rights were purchased by the petitioner in 1973. Clause 4 (c) of the said Indenture reads thus:

"4 (C) The lessee shall not use the said land and building that may be erected thereon during the said terms for any other purpose than for purpose of a residential house, without the consent in writing of the lessor. "

( 3 ) THE petitioner asserted that the second respondent/tenant had not been using the premises for residential purposes and the user had been permitted by the lesser in terms of the lease deed. She filed an application for eviction of the respondent No. 2 from the tenanted premises on the ground that she was in bona fide requirement thereof for its occupation for residence for herself and members of her family. The said application was dismissed by the Additional rent Controller, Delhi by an order dated 17th May 1991, inter alia, holding that the petitioner herein had failed to prove that the premises in question was initially let out to the petitioner for residential purposes. So far as the claim of bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises by the petitioner in terms of Section 14 (l) (e) of the said Act is concerned, it was held:

"summing up, since in the ground under section 14 (l) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1 find that the petitioner has not succeeded in establishing that the premises in suit were let out to the respondents only for the purposes of residence, so consequently, the petitioner is not entitled for eviction order against the respondents under section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act because she has failed in establishing one of the four essential ingredients in her favour as discussed above in detail. "

( 4 ) AN appeal was preferred thereagainst by the petitioner herein before the Rent Control Tribunal and the said Tribunal by a judgment dated 10th November 1998 dismissed the said appeal. In the afore-mentioned situation, this writ petition has been filed.

( 5 ) MR. Gambhir, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would contend that a similar provision occurring in East Punjab Urban rent Restriction Act had been held to be discriminatory in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab and Anr. , AIR 1996 SC 857 and thus, the same Section 14 (l) (e) of ihe Act should also be held to be ultra vires in so far as thereby no provision has been made for eviction of tenant holding non-residential premises on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord.

( 6 ) THE learned counsel would contend that the Act was enacted having regard to the need of the society prevailing thence. According to the learned counsel, although vires of the said provision have been upheld by a division Bench of this court in H. C. Sharma v. Life Insurance Corporation of india, ILR (1973) Delhi 90 but the said decision must be held to have been impliedly over-ruled by the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra ). In any event, after a lapse of 48 years, it was argued, keeping in view the changed situation, it does not stand to any reason as to why a decree for eviction in respect of a building which is used for commercial purposes, cannot be sought for all hough the landlord requires the same for residential purposes. The distinction between the residential purpose and non-residential purpose, the learned counsel would contend, being artificial, the same cannot stand the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that having regard to the present day need. the Parliament also thought it fit to make a new provision by enacting the delhi Rent Act, 1995, the relevant provisions where