2002 Supreme(SC) 348

2002(2) Supreme 359
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Chennai High Court)
S.P. Bharucha, CJI., R.C. Lahoti, N. Santosh Hegde, Mrs. Ruma Pal and Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. -Petitioners
versus
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 1997
With
Civil Appeal No. 2058 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12806 of 2000)
Decided on 13-3-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant in C.A. No. 2226/97 : V. Balachandran, S. Aravindh, Senthil Jagadeesen and V. Ramasubramanian, Advocates.
For the Appellant in C.A. No. 2058/2002 : K.V. Viswanathan, K.V. Venkataraman, Atul Kumar Sinha, B. Raghunath, Kunwar Ajit Mohan Singh, Advocates.
For the Respondents : T.V. Viswanatha Iyer and R. Mohan, Sr. Advocates, V. Balaji, P.N. Ramalingam and V.G. Pragasam, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Once a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.

Headnote:(i) Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 6-Quashing of notification under Section 6-Whether fresh period of one year is available to State Government to issue another Notification under Section 6 of the Act-(No)-Once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.

       Held : In the case at hand the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued and the declaration was made prior to the substitution of the existing proviso to Section 6(1) by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24.8.1984. In other words, the Notification under Section 4(1) was issued before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, but after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (replaced by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act 1967 (Act 13 of 1967). But the substituted proviso was in operation on the date of the impugned judgment. In terms of the proviso, the declaration cannot be made under Section 6 in respect of any land covered by the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act after the expiry of three years or one year from the date of its publication, as the case may be. The proviso deals with two types of situations. It provides for different periods of limitation depending upon the question whether (i) the notification under Section 4(1) was published prior to commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, or (ii) such notification was issued after Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In the former case, the period is three years whereas in the latter case it is one year. Undoubtedly, the Notification under Section 6(1) was made and published in the official gazette within the period of three years prescribed under the proviso thereto, and undisputedly, the same had been quashed by the High Court in an earlier proceeding. It has to be noted that Explanation 1 appended to Section 6(1) provides that in computing the period of three years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the Notification under Section 4(1), is stayed by an order of the Court, shall be excluded. (Para 7)

       (ii) Interpretation of Statutes-Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous-Legislative casus omissius cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

       Held : Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. (Para 9)

       It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (Para 12)

       Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the while statue. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. (Para 15)