( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition are that K. K. Sarin, petitioner herein, alleging himself to beowner landlord of the premises S-108, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi filed an eviction petition under Section 14c of the Delhi Rent Control Act, as amended, against M/s. Pigott Chapman and Co. through its partners, respondent herein. The grounds taken in the eviction petition are that the premises were let out for residence and that the same are required by the petitioner for his residence and for the residence of his family members and servants dependent upon him for the purpose of residence. At the time of letting out the premises, the petitioner was in occupation of a government allotted accommodation being the Central Govt. employee. He was going to retire on 30th June, 1991 and he would have to vacate the allotted accommodation after his retirement and that he bad no other residential accommodation at Delhi.

( 2 ) SINCE this petition was filed under Section 14c, summons in Third Schedule of the Act were issued to the respondents who appeared and filed application for leave to defend along with an affidavit. The Rent Controller (Smt. Mamta Sehgal) vide her order deted 16. 4. 90 granted leave to the respondent.

( 3 ) AGGRIEVED, this revision petition has been filed. I have heard the Counsel for the parties and gone through the record.

( 4 ) A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondent tenant that the revision petition filed against the order granting leave to defend is not maintainable as it has no effect of concluding the proceedings. According to him Section 25b (8) of the Act does not cover interim orders like the grant of leave which do not conclude the proceedings. Reliance has been placed by him on three decisions of single Judges of this Court in Devi Singh v. Chaman Lal, 1977 Rajdhani Law Reporter 566, Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain, 1979 RLR 159 and Bhagwati Prashad v. 0m Prakash, 1979 RLR 26 in support of his contentions.

( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner countered the argument of the Counsel for the tenant and drew my attention towards the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chowdhry v. Narain Devi, 1980 Rajdhani Law Reporter (SC) 159 in support of his contention that Section 25b (8), proviso is not happily worded as its language speaks of right of revision only against an eviction order. The provision excludes right of appeal under Sections 38 and 39 and to make it equally applicable to both the parties and to prevent it from being branded as discriminatory and constitutionally invalid, the provision deserves to be made applicable to both landlord and tenant. Section 25b (8) is exhaustive of the right of revision about orders made under Section 25b (4) of the Act.

( 6 ) SECTION 25b (8) and its proviso came for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chowdhry (supra) and their Lordships after considering the decision of this Court in Devi Singh v. Chaman Lal (supra) Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain (supra) and Bhagwati Prashad. v. 0m Parkash (supra) came to the conclusion that Section 2 5b (8) proviso Is not happily worded as it speaks of right of revision only against an eviction order. The interpretation of sub-Section (8) of Section 25b and its proviso as made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court leads one to the conclusion that Section 25b (8) is exhaustive of the rights of revision about the orders made under Section 25b (4) of the Act and does not mention one which refuses the relief of eviction to the landlord. Proviso to Section 25b (8) provides that the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this Section Is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. Proviso does not say "an order for the recovery of possession", or even such orders as aforesaid, but instead employs the words "an order made by the Controller under this Section", Sult