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Checking relevance for Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. VS State of Uttar Pradesh...
Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. VS State of Uttar Pradesh - 2024 6 Supreme 257 : Section 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) pertains to criminal breach of trust. The document clarifies that in cases involving sale of goods, once property passes to the purchaser upon delivery, the purchaser cannot be said to have been entrusted with the seller''''s property. Therefore, failure to pay consideration amount for goods sold constitutes a civil wrong, not a criminal offence under Section 316(2). Consequently, prosecution for criminal breach of trust based on non-payment of consideration is flawed and not maintainable; only a civil remedy exists for such default. This directly addresses the relationship between ''''streedhan'''' (a term often referring to a woman''''s personal property or dowry in legal contexts) and Section 316 of the BNS by establishing that mere non-payment of money due in a commercial transaction—such as purchase price—does not constitute criminal breach of trust unless there was actual entrustment of property with dishonest misappropriation, which is not present in this scenario.Checking relevance for Shailesh Kumar Singh Alias Shailesh R. Singh VS State of Uttar Pradesh...
Checking relevance for Mulakala Malleshwara Rao VS State of Telangana...
Mulakala Malleshwara Rao VS State of Telangana - 2024 6 Supreme 451 : Section 316 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the successor provision to Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with criminal breach of trust. The document explicitly states that a Hindu married woman is the absolute owner of her Stridhan (dowry or personal property) and can deal with it in any manner she likes. The husband has no right over it, and by logical extension, a father also has no right over his daughter''''s Stridhan when she is alive, well, and capable of making decisions. This principle is directly relevant to cases involving alleged illegal retention or conversion of Stridhan by in-laws, and forms the basis for determining whether a cognizable offence under Section 316 (formerly Section 406 IPC) is made out. The document further clarifies that giving dowry or traditional presents at the time of marriage does not create a presumption that such articles were entrusted to parents-in-law, and thus cannot attract the ingredients of a criminal offence under Section 316 or Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.Checking relevance for Janak Raj VS Gurdial Singh...
Janak Raj VS Gurdial Singh - 1966 0 Supreme(SC) 310 : Section 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877 (as amended in 1879) provided that the purchaser would have title to the property sold from the date of confirmation of the sale only if the decree under which the sale took place was subsisting at that date. This proviso was included as a necessary condition for the commencement of the title of the auction purchaser. However, when the Code of 1908 was enacted, Section 316 was split into Section 65 and Order XXI, Rule 94, and the proviso was not retained. As a result, under the current Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court is bound to confirm the sale and direct the grant of a certificate vesting the title in the purchaser from the date of sale, regardless of whether the decree has been reversed before confirmation, unless an application under Rules 89 to 91 is made and allowed. The deletion of the proviso was intended to protect bona fide purchasers and ensure that sales in execution proceed without uncertainty, even if the decree is later set aside.Checking relevance for Dattatraya VS State Of Maharashtra...
Dattatraya VS State Of Maharashtra - 2024 3 Supreme 180 : Section 316 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) deals with the punishment for causing the death of a child in the womb of its mother. In the case discussed, the deceased woman was nine months pregnant at the time of her death, and she gave birth to a stillborn child the next day while still alive. The court held that the act of the appellant—pouring kerosene on his wife while she was cooking—resulted in her death and also caused the death of the unborn child, thereby constituting an offence under Section 316 of the IPC. The court emphasized that the fact that the child was born stillborn while the mother was still alive makes the case fall under Section 316. Additionally, the document references that ''''streedhan'''' is not explicitly defined in the provided text, but the context of the case involves a wife''''s death due to domestic violence, which may be indirectly related to issues concerning a woman''''s property rights (streedhan) in marital disputes. However, the document does not provide a legal definition or discussion of ''''streedhan'''' itself. The primary legal answer provided is that Section 316 of the IPC applies when a child dies in the womb due to an act causing the mother''''s death, and this was applicable in the case due to the stillbirth occurring while the mother was alive.Checking relevance for Ahsan VS State of U. P. ...
Checking relevance for Anandan R. , S/o. Raghavan S. VS State Of Kerala, Represented By The Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Kerala...
Anandan R. , S/o. Raghavan S. VS State Of Kerala, Represented By The Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Kerala - 2025 0 Supreme(Ker) 13 : Section 316(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) is pari materia to Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Both provisions deal with criminal breach of trust by a public servant, banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney, or agent who is entrusted with property or dominion over property. The offence under Section 316(5) BNS is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and also liable to fine. This provision mirrors the language and intent of Section 409 IPC, particularly in relation to the misappropriation of property entrusted in a fiduciary capacity. The document explicitly equates the two sections, indicating that they are legally comparable in scope and application.
