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1998(2) Supreme 478
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
M.M. Punchhi, CJI., K.T. Thomas and M. Srinivasan, JJ.
Sri Kishan @ Krishan Kumar etc. -Appellants
versus
Manoj Kumar etc. etc. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1991
And
Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1991
Decided on 12-2-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : G.L. Sanghi, Sr. Advocate, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Anam and Ms. Shobha Advocates in C.A. No. 356/91 and Mahabir Singh Advocate in C.A. No. 357/91.
For the Respondents : Pankaj Kalra and B.K. Sharma, Advocates.
Held : There is no provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of a civil court to dispose of a suit validly instituted. There is also no provision preventing the execution of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13(1) does not expressly refer to execution of a decree for possession. On a reading of all the provisions of the Act, it is evident that it has not prevented a civil court from adjudicating the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the building in question. If the Legislature had intended to take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide a suit which had been validly instituted, it would have been worded differently. The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily under Section 1(3) is to encourage construction of new buildings. That purpose would be defeated if the owner of the building is deprived of his right to get possession of the building unless he gets a decree within a period of ten years from the date of its completion. In fact the logical consequence of the argument of the appellants if accepted would be that even if a decree is obtained by the landlord within ten years from its completion it cannot be executed after the expiry of the said period of ten years as such execution would not be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is common knowledge that a proceeding in a civil court for recovery of immovable property could be dragged on by the defendant easily for a period of ten years or more and thereby any tenant whose tenancy had been terminated validly before the suit would successfully make the proceeding infructuous by prolonging the litigation. The argument of the appellants cannot be accepted as otherwise the purpose of exemption would get defeated. (Para 8)
Section 13 of the Act does not make any reference to a decree passed in a civil suit. When a suit is validly instituted and the rights of parties which had crystallised on the date of the suit are determined by a decree in that suit the execution thereof cannot be stopped by the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. (Para 21)
Judgment
Srinivasan, J.-The only question to be considered in these two appeals is whether the Courts below were barred by the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act 1973 from passing decrees directing the appellants to deliver possession of the properties scheduled in the suits to the respondents.
2. The facts in both the cases are almost the same with some difference in dates. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1991 was inducted as a tenant in one shop on 1.11.1977. The building was constructed a few months before the commencement of the tenancy. The tenancy was terminated by a notice issued on August 10, 1983 by the respondent. The suit for possession was filed on 26.9.83. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1991 became a tenant of another shop on 1.8.1977. The construction of the shop had been completed only a short time before the commencement of the tenancy. The tenancy was terminated by the respondent in that appeal by notice dated 3.11.1981. The suit for possession was filed on 24.9.83.
3. Both suits were tried along with other suits against tenants of other shops on similar facts by the Senior Sub Judge, Sonepat. In all the suits, the defendants/tenants raised several contentions including challenge to the title of the plaintiffs and the quantum of rent. All the issues were answered in favour of the plaintiffs and decrees were passed on 8.12.88. Appeals in the Court of Additional District Judge suffered dismissal on 26.10.89. Second appeals were dismissed in limine by the High Court with ‘one word orders’. It is only these two appellants who have come to this Court. An attempt has been made to canvass all the findings of Courts below but as they are factual and supported by evidence on record we have no difficulty in rejecting the same.
4. The only question which has been argued at length and survives for our consideration is the one set out in the beginning. The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, hereinafter referred to as ‘The Act’ came into force on April 25, 1973. It is an Act to control the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas, and the eviction of tenants therefrom. Section 1(3) of the Act reads thus:
1(3) “Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its completion.”
There is no doubt that when the suits in these cases were filed by the respondents, the Act was not applicable in view of the said section. But before the trial concluded, the moratorium period of ten years came to an end and the decrees were passed only thereafter. The appellants contend that the Court lost its jurisdiction on the expiry of the ten-year period and the decree passed thereafter is a nullity. For raising this contention the appellants invoke in their aid the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act which is in the following terms:
13(1) “A tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of this Section.”
It is argued that a special forum has been created and a specific procedure has been prescribed in the Act without resort to which a tenant cannot be evicted from the demised premises.
5. It is argued that the Act is intended to be beneficial to the tenants and special protection is afforded to them. According to the learned counsel for the purpose of the Act the expression ‘tenant’ includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and at the expiry of period of ten years set out in Section 1(3) of the Act, the ‘building’ comes within the fold of the Act and the tenant in occupation will automatically have the protection afforded by the Act. Emphasis is laid on the wording of Section 13 (1) which prevents eviction of a tenant in possession except in accordance with the provisions of the Section
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