2003(1) Supreme 228
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Patna High Court)
R.C. Lahoti & Brijesh Kumar, JJ.
Sharda Devi -Appellant
versus
State of Bihar & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 14198/1996
Decided on 8-1-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : H.K. Lal, M.P. Jha, Ram Ekbal Roy, Gopal Prasad, Advocates.
For the Respondent : B.B. Singh, Advocate (N.P.), Ashok Mathur, Advocates.
Held : The sole question which arises for decision in this appeal centers around the question referred to herein above, i.e., whether in the facts and circumstances of the case a reference u/s 30 of the Act was competent ? In other words, the core question is - when the State proceeds to acquire land on an assumption that it belongs to a particular person, can the award be called into question by the State seeking a reference u/s 30 of the Act on the premise that the land did not belong to the person from whom it was purportedly acquired and was a land owned by the State having vested in it, consequent upon abolition of proprietory rights, much before acquisition ? (Para 10)
Held after detailed discussion : To sum up the State is not a person interested as defined in Section 3(2) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression parties to the litigation carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by State cannot be subject matter of acquisition by State the question of deciding the ownership of State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in proceedings before the Collector (as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act). If it was a government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the Civil Court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the Court was wholly without jurisdiction and the Civil Court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the Civil Court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so. However, we would like to clarify our decision by sounding two notes of caution. Firstly, the quashing of the proceedings under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act would not debar the State from pursuing such other legal remedy before such other forum as may be available to the State Government and on the merits and the maintainability thereof we express no opinion herein. Secondly, the situation in law would have been entirely different if the title of the appellant would have come to an end by any event happening or change taking place after the making of the award by the Collector as was the case in Dr. G.H. Grant vs. State of Bihar - (1965) 3 SCR 576. The title of Dr. Ghosh had come to an end by change of law referable to a date subsequent to the making of the award. In this context it was held - "............ there is no reason why the right to claim a reference of a dispute about the person entitled to compensation may not be exercised by the person on whom the title has devolved since the date of the award" and "there is nothing in Section 30 which excludes a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has, since the award, devolved". (Paras 36 and 37)
Held consequently : For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge restored with costs throughout. (Para 38)
JUDGMENT
R.C. Lahoti, J.-The land, which is the subject matter of controversy in these proceedings, is 36.86 acres area out of the total area of 45.92 acres of land of plot Nos. 4, 5 and 10 appertaining to khata No. 151 of Village Phulsari, District Lohardaga. Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter the Act for short) was issued on 16.02.1982 for acquiring the said land for the project called Phulsari Sapathi Nala. Declaration u/s 6 of the Act was issued on 25.05.1982. Objections u/s 9 of the Act were filed by the appellant herein. The State through Circle Officer, Kuru filed reply to the objections. On 19.02.1986 the Collector made an award under Section 11 of the Act directing the compensation, as appointed by him, to be paid to Smt. Sharda Devi, the appellant.
2. The relevant facts, which are beyond the pale of controversy at this stage and as would set out briefly the history of litigation, may be noticed. According to the appellant, the said land was Gairmajrua Malik land. It was a part of zamindari estate. Before vesting of zamindari, the land was settled by the ex-landlord in the name of one Deo Narain Prasad by means of a registered deed of settlement dated 24.04.1954. It was a raiyati settlement. The appellant purchased the land from the said Deo Narain Prasad through a registered deed of sale dated 07.09.1962. The appellant has developed the land and kept it under cultivation raising the crops. Her name was mutated in the revenue records by the Circle Officer. A correction slip was issued to her in her name. The State realized revenue from her from the very date of vesting, i.e. from 1955 till 1975. The rent receipts were exhibited on record.
3. On 18.05.1979, the Circle Officer issued a notice u/s 3 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 (Bihar Act XV of 1956) calling upon the appellant to explain why she should not be treated as an encroacher on the land and why her encroachment should not be removed. The notice was issued on the premise that consequent upon vesting of zamindaris, the said land had stood vested in the State of Bihar and was, therefore, public land within the meaning of clause (3) of Section 2 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956. The appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court registered as Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 366 of 1979 (R), laying challenge to the initiation of such proceedings. The counsel for the State made appearance though a written counter affidavit was not filed. The High Court after hearing both the parties, upheld the plea of the appellant that the said land was Gairmajrua Malik and not Gairmajrua Aam land and by virtue of the registered deed of transfer in favour of Deo Narain Prasad, the predecessor-in-title of the appellant, the appellant was justified in claiming that she was raiyat of the land in question and, therefore, could be ejected therefrom only in accordance with the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. Inasmuch as such ejectment is permissible only on specified grounds, none of which existed in the present case, the notice issued to the appellant was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The High Court by order dated 23.07.1984 allowed the Writ Petition and directed the proceedings initiated against the appellant under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 to be quashed.
4. In the year 1981, proceedings u/s 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 proposing to annul the settlement of land in question in favour of Deo Narain Prasad were initiated. The proceedings were founded on the premise that the said settlement was done with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act. An inquiry was held. Once again the appellant filed a Writ Petition seeking quashing of these proceedings. The petition was registered as CWJC No. 1663 of 1981 (R) and disposed of by the High Court by order dated 25.03.1987.
5. During the pendency of these proceedings, notification u/s 4(1)
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