Judgement

RANGANATH MISRA, J. : - This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court by which it has quashed an order of detention of the respondent made under S. 3(2), National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The High Court relied upon a decision of a Full Bench of that Court in Ashok Dixit v. State, disposed of on 1-8-1985 being Habeas Corpus Petition No. 11161 of 1984 for its conclusion that the detention of the respondent was bad in law. The majority opinion of the Full Bench, as far as relevant, said

"A solitary assault on one individual which may well be equated with ordinary murder can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. It can only raise a law and order problem and no more. Assaulting an individual in a bus or train on account of enmity may affect only certain individuals; but if the assault is made indiscriminately in the bus or train and passengers are harassed indiscriminately the same would be likely to endanger public order as this kind of incident is bound to have such impact that it will disturb the even tempo of life of the community. The act or incident which may be attributed to the detenu may be reprehensible and yet if it concerns only specific individuals and it has no impact on the general members of the community and has no potentiality of disturbing the even tempo of life of the people, it cannot be held to be an activity prejudicial to public order."

2. The Full Bench in its turn referred to several decisions of this Court in its attempt to bring out a distinction between the concepts of law and order and public order and one of such decisions of this Court is the case of Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal. (1969) 2 SCR 635 : (AIR 1970 SC 852). This Court said therein (at p. 857 of AIR) :

"The difference between the concepts of public order and law and order is similar to the distinction between public and private crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering the material elements of crime, the historic tests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness or the social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen has distinguished public and private crimes in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. (See Dr. Allens Legal Duties 249) There is a broad distinction along these lines the differences naturally arise in the application of any such test."

3. It is claimed that these observations of this Court were taken as the guidelines by the Full Bench to ascertain whether the allegations brought the case within the purview of public order. Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly canvassed that the test laid down by Dr. Allen was not applicable to judge the validity of a detention order and the High Court has gone wrong in quashing the detention of the respondent.

4. It has not been disputed at the Bar that public order and law and order are two distinct concepts. There is abundance of authority of this Court drawing the distinction between the two. In the case of Supdt. Central Prisons. Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 SCR 821 : (AIR 1960 SC 633) Subba Rao J., as he then was, spoke for the Court thus :

"The expression public order has a very wide connotation. Public Order is the basic need in any organised society. It implies the orderly state of society any community in which citizens can peacefully pursue their normal activities of life. In the words of an eminent Judge of the Supreme Court of America "the essential rights are subject to the elementary need for order without which the guarantee of those rights would be a mockery ............. It (public order) is synonymous wit