SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.M. LODHA, CJI., A.K. PATNAIK, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, DIPAK MISRA, FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.
Dr. Subramanian Swamy & Another – Appellants
Versus
Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Others – Respondents
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 1997 With Writ Petition (Civil) No. 21 of 2004
Decided On : 06-05-2014
(1955) 1 SCR 1045; 1959 SCR 279; (1973) 1 SCC 500 – Relied upon
(1950) SCR 869; (1951) SCR 682; (1952) SCR 284; 1952 SCR 435; 1952 SCR 710; (1953) 4 SCR 589; 1953 SCR 661; (1954) SCR 30; (1954) SCR 1117 – Referred
(b) Constitution of India – Article 14 – Reasonable classification – Nexus with object of classification – If object to discriminate against one section the classification, even if reasonable, cannot be justified. (Para 43)
(1973) 1 SCC 500; (1979) 1 SCC 380; (1955) 1 SCR 1045; 1959 SCR 279; (1960) 2 SCR 592; (1960) 2 SCR 646; (1962) 2 SCR 125; (1960) 2 SCR 646; (1974) 3 SCR 760; (1981) 4 SCC 335; (1983) 1 SCC 305; (1974) 4 SCC 3 – Relied upon
(c) Constitution of India – Article 14 – Constitutional validity – Presumption of constitutionality of enactment – Can be challenged on two grounds (i) discrimination, based on an impermissible or invalid classification and (ii) excessive delegation of powers or conferment of uncanalised and unguided powers on the executive. (Para 48)
(d) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A – Single Directive 4.7(3)(i) quashed by Vineet Narain1 – On the ground that law does not classify offenders differently for treatment thereunder, including investigation of offences and prosecution for offences, according to their status in life – Despite such quashing, section 6-A replicates Single Directive 4.7(3)(i). (Para 53, 55)
(1998) 1 SCC 226; (1980) 1 SCC 554; (1991) 3 SCC 655 – Relied upon
(1998) 8 SCC 188; (2003) 7 SCC 151; (2005) 1 SCC 496 – Referred
(e) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A and Article 14, Constitution of India – Making classification on basis of status in Government service – Not permissible under Article 14 – Section 6-A advances public mischief and protects the crime-doer – Puts fetters even on preliminary enquiry by CBI – No distinction can be made for certain class of officers specified in Section 6-A – In accusation of bribery, graft, illegal gratification or criminal misconduct status of offender is not of any relevance – Decision to commence investigation must lie with CBI and none else. (Para 58, 60, 63, 64)
(1974) 3 SCR 760; (1998) 1 SCC 226 – Relied upon
(f) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A – For offences under PC Act one set of officers provided protection while other set of same rank and status denied the protection – Such protection depriving CBI of authority even of preliminary investigation – Decision making power does not segregate corrupt officers into two classes – Cannot be justified being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. (Para 67, 71)
(g) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 and section 6-A, DSPE Act – Section 19 provides protection from frivolous and malicious prosecution to every public servant, irrespective of his position in service – No protection was available during the period between striking down Single Directive and enactment of section 6-A – No allegation of CBI harassing any officer or investigating frivolous and vexatious complaints during this period – No justification for discriminating protection u/s 6-A. (Para 75, 84)
(h) Constitution of India – Article 14 – Rule of law – Is a facet of equality under Article 14 – reach of rule of law amounts to breach of Article 14 – Breach of rule of law may be a ground for invalidating legislation. (Para 85)
(1977) 4 SCC 608; (1997) 3 SCC 261; (2006) 7 SCC 1; (2010) 11 SCC 1; (2011) 9 SCC 1; (1995) 5 SCC 96; (2000) 1 SCC 168 – Relied upon
(1978) 1 SCC 248; (1981) 1 SCC 722; (1998) 2 SCC 1; (2004) 4 SCC 311; (1973) 4 SCC 225; (2008) 6 SCC 1; (2012) 10 SCC 1; (1996) 3 SCC 709; (2012) 6 SCC 312; 509 U.S. 312 (1993); 1975 (Suppl.) SCC 1; (1955) 2 SCR 925; (1998) 2 SCC 109; (1971) 2 SCC 119 – Referred
(i) Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 – Section 155 and section 6-A, DSPE Act – Local police may investigate a senior Government officer without previous approval of the Central Government u/s 155 – CBI cannot do so because of section 6-A – Very object of the provision has been rendered discriminatory and violative of Article 14. (Para 86)
(2011) 4 SCC 1; (2014) 2 SCC 532 – Relied upon
(2012) 3 SCC 1; 1952 SCR 597 – Referred
(j) Administrative Law – Corruption in Public employment – PC Act aims at curbing the same – However section 6-A of DSPE Act runs counter to the object and reason of the PC Act, 1988 – It also undermines the object of detecting and punishing high level corruption. (Para 87)
(2000) 5 SCC 88; (1999) 5 SCC 138; (2001) 5 SCC 755; (2004) 9 SCC 319; (2005) 5 SCC 517; (2012) 3 SCC 64; (2012) 12 SCC 384; (2013) 3 SCC 1; (2014) 2 SCC 532 – Relied upon
Delhi HC W.P.(C) No.9338/2009 – Cited with approval
(1970) 1 SCC 595 – Referred
(k) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A – Decision in K. Veeraswami has no application to the senior public servants specified in Section 6-A – Conclusion in Vineet Narain1 is not inconsistent with the findings in K. Veeraswami. (Para 94)
(1998) 1 SCC 226; (1991) 3 SCC 655 – Relied upon
(l) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A and section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – There is no similarity between the two provisions. (Para 95)
(m) Constitutional validity of statute – Has to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 – Not by applying any general rule. (Para 95)
(n) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A – Does not satisfy tests in context of Article 14 – Not capable of severance for the purposes of Section 13(1)(d)(ii) and (iii), PC Act. (Para 96)
(o) Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – Section 6-A – Held invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution – As a necessary corollary, Section 26 (c) of Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 Act also declared invalid to that extent. (Para 98)
Facts of the case:
This case relates to necessity of previous approval of the Governmwent for enquiry by the CBI against any officer of the level of Joint Secretary and above under the PC Act.
Constitutional validity of Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and Section 26(c) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 is under challenge in these petitions.
Finding of the Court:
Section 6-A held invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and as a necessary corollary, Section 26 (c) of the CVC Act also declared invalid to that extent.
Result: Petitions allowed.
JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, CJI. –
Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short, ‘the DSPE Act’), which was inserted by Act 45 of 2003, reads as under:
“Section 6-A. Approval of Central Government to conduct inquiry or investigation.- (1) The Delhi Special Police Establishment shall not conduct any inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) except with the previous approval of the Central Government where such allegation relates to-
(a) the employees of the Central Government of the Level of Joint Secretary and above; and
(b) such officers as are appointed by the Central Government in corporations established by or under any Central Act, Government companies, societies and local authorities owned or controlled by that Government.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any gratification other than legal remuneration referred to in clause (c) of the Explanation to section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988).”
2. The constitutional validity of Section 6-A is in issue in these two writ petitions, both filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. Since Section 6-A came to be inserted by Section 26(c) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (Act 45 of 2003), the constitutional validity of Section 26(c) has also been raised. It is not necessary to independently refer to Section 26(c). Our reference to Section 6-A of the DSPE Act, wherever necessary, shall be treated as reference to Section 26(c) of the Act 45 of 2003 as well.
Reference to the Constitution Bench
3. On February 4, 2005 when these petitions came up for consideration, the Bench thought that these matters deserved to be heard by the larger Bench. The full text of the reference order is as follows:
“In these petitions challenge is to the constitutional validity of Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short, “the Act”). This section was inserted in the Act w.e.f. 12-9-2003. It, inter alia, provides for obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government for conduct of any inquiry or investigation for any offence alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 where allegations relate to officers of the level of Joint Secretary and above. Before insertion of Section 6-A in the Act, the requirement to obtain prior approval of the Central Government was contained in a directive known as “Single Directive” issued by the Government. The Single Directive was a consolidated set of instructions issued to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) by various Ministries/Departments regarding modalities of initiating an inquiry or registering a case against certain categories of civil servants. The said directive was stated to have been issued to protect decision-making-level officers from the threat and ignominy of malicious and vexatious inquiries/investigations and to give protection to officers at the decision-making level and to relieve them of the anxiety from the likelihood of harassment for taking honest decisions. It was said that absence of such protection to them could adversely affect the efficiency and efficacy of these institutions because of the tendency of such officers to avoid taking any decisions which could later lead to harassment by any malicious and vexatious inquiries/investigations.
2. The Single Directive was quashed by this Court in a judgment delivered on 18-12-1997 (Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 1 SCC 226). Within a few months after Vineet Narain judgment, by the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1998 dated 25-8-1998, Section 6-A was sought to be inserted providing for the previous approval of the Central Vigilance Commission before investigation of the officers of the level of Joint S
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