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2023 Supreme(SC) 405

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KRISHNA MURARI, SANJAY KAROL, JJ.
SHAIFUDDIN (DEAD) THR. LRS. - APPELLANT
VERSUS
KANHAIYA LAL (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS. - RESPONDENTS
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11040 OF 2013
Decided On : 17-04-2023

Important Points

IMPORTANT POINT
Execution of decree – Limitation period would commence only with decree becoming enforceable and is capable of being executed.

Subject

Execution of Decree - Limitation Period

Act Referred

Headnote

Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 136 – Execution of decree – Limitation – Limitation period would commence only with decree becoming enforceable and is capable of being executed – In instant case, relevant date from which period of limitation will begin only with effect from 31.03.1994 – Period of twelve years is computable from said date, Execution Application made on 17.07.1995 is within Limitation – Courts below rightly held that Execution Application is within Limitation – Appeal dismissed. (Paras 11, 13 and 15)

Facts of the case:

By way of this appeal, the judgment dated 04.01.2006 in Civil Revision No. 715/2002 passed by High Court of Madhya Pradesh, is called into question by the appellants. This order is assailed on the ground that the execution application was filed after 12 years from the date of the decree, and the same was therefore, barred by time. Consequently, it is prayed that Revisional Court was not justified in dismissing the revision petition.

Findings of Court:

Clause 6 of compromise decree could not have been executed unless Decree Holders were to lose their right of possession, which fact was not a possibility unless such rights stood conclusively determined by the Civil Court.

Result : Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • practice and procedure
    • civil procedure
      • execution of decrees
        • limitation (Para 3, 11)

Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Ms. Pratibha Jain, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Ashok Mathur, AOR Mr. B. K. Satija,

Table of Contents

1. Dispute regarding the limitation period for executing a conditional compromise decree for land transfer under the Limitation Act, 1963. (Para 2 , 7 , 8 )

2. Whether the limitation period for execution commences from the date of the compromise decree or the date the decree becomes enforceable. (Para 1 , 2 )

3. The decree became enforceable only upon the decree-holders' dispossession, as the conditional clause required a conclusive determination of the loss of possession. (Para 9 , 10 )

4. Under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period for executing a decree begins from the date the decree becomes enforceable. (Para 3 , 11 )

5. Appeal dismissed; the execution application was held to be within the prescribed limitation period. (Para 13 , 15 )

6. When does the limitation period for executing a decree begin under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Execution proceedings must be initiated within 12 years from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable, or when a default in payment or delivery occurs if a specific date was directed. (Para 3 )

7. Can a decree become enforceable on a date other than the date it was passed?

Yes. While normally enforceable from its date, a court may prescribe a future date, or the decree may become enforceable upon the happening of certain specified events. (Para 4 , 6 )

8. What is the guiding principle for interpreting a decree's enforceability when the language is ambiguous?

The interpretation that assists the decree-holder in obtaining the fruits of the decree should be accepted, ensuring the decree is not rendered futile by technicalities. (Para 4 )

JUDGMENT :

(SANJAY KAROL, J.)

1. By way of this appeal, the judgment dated 04.01.2006 in Civil Revision No. 715/2002 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, is called into question by the appellants. This order is assailed on the ground that the execution application was filed after 12 years from the date of the decree, and the same was therefore, barred by time. Consequently, it is prayed that the Revisional Court was not justified in dismissing the revision petition.

2. The question which arises in this Appeal before us is whether the date on which the compromise decree dated 26.04.1960 was entered into in Civil First Appeal No.11/1959 or the date when the final decree was passed by the Civil Court in Suit No. 30 A/87 i.e. 31.03.1994, will be considered for establishing the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter “the Act”) for instituting execution proceedings?

3. It is imperative to discuss the legislative provision governing the limitation period in the execution of a decree i.e., Article 136 of the Act. The said Article is specific as it prescribes and deals with the applications for the execution of decrees and orders. It provides that the execution proceedings have to be initiated within 12 years from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place.

4. This Court, in Deep Chand v. Mohan Lal , (2000) 6 SCC 259, Paragraph 5, (2 judges), while dealing with the interpretation of Article 136 of the Act made pertinent observations to the effect that:

i . A decree or order becomes enforceable from its date;

ii. In appropriate cases the court passing the decree may prescribe the time wherefrom the decree becomes enforceable on a future date.

iii. The purpose of an execution proceeding is to enable the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of his decree.

iv. In case where the language of the decree is capable of two interpretations, one of which assists the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of the decree and the other prevents him from taking the benefits of the decree, the interpretation which assists the decree-holder should be accepted.

v. A decree is not to be rendered futile on technicalities. A rational approach is necessitated in cases where a decree has been the subject of prolonged litigation and a fair construction is to be given thereto.

5. In Akkayanaicker v. A.A.A. Kotchadainaidu & Anr., (2004) 12 SCC 469 this Court (2-Judge Bench) held that in view of the words "when the decree or order becomes enforceable" occurring in Article 136 of the Act, the starting point of limitation would be the date on which the decree becomes capable of execution.

6. Furthermore, in Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi , (2012) 3 SCC 548, this Court (2 Judges) observed:

“41. In this context, we may usefully refer to the dictum in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh [(2001) 1 SCC 469] wherein, while dwelling upon the concept of enforceability of a decree and the effect of an order of stay passed by the appellate court, the Bench stated thus:

“8. When is a decree becoming enforceable? Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified events. The expression ‘enforceable’ has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which become enforceable subsequently.” ”

(Emphasis Supplied)

7. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is significant to reproduce clause 6 of compromise decree dt 26.04.1960 in Civil First Appeal No. 11/1959 :

“That after institution of this suit and during the pendency of the case in the District Judge Court, the appellant started proceedings to surrender certain part of the land to the government. B


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