IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Suraj Govindaraj, J.
Ishwarayya Girimallayya Kambi - Appellant
Versus
Special Land Acquisition Officer - Respondent
Civil Revision Petition No. 100045 of 2021 (-)C/W Civil Revision Petition No. 100039 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100040 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100041 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100042 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100043 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100044 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100046 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100047 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100048 of 2021 Civil Revision Petition No. 100049 of 2021
Decided On : 18-04-2022
Limitation - Execution Proceedings - [Upper Krishna Project] - [Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963] - [Art. 136, S. 24 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, S.54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908] - The court discussed the interpretation of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and its application to the enforcement of decrees. It emphasized that the period of limitation for filing execution proceedings commences when the decree becomes enforceable, not based on any acknowledgment made by the judgment debtor or otherwise. The court held that the law of limitation acts in a draconian manner, requiring parties to approach the court within the prescribed time period, and dismissed the petitions on the grounds of limitation.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners sought to set aside an order dismissing execution petitions as being barred by time. The land owners had filed execution proceedings after an award was passed, but the Execution Court dismissed the proceedings as time-barred.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the period of limitation for filing execution proceedings commences when the decree becomes enforceable, not based on any acknowledgment made by the judgment debtor or otherwise. It emphasized that the law of limitation acts in a draconian manner, requiring parties to approach the court within the prescribed time period, and dismissed the petitions on the grounds of limitation.
Issues: The main issue was whether the execution proceedings were time-barred under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the period of limitation for filing execution proceedings commences when the decree becomes enforceable, not based on any acknowledgment made by the judgment debtor or otherwise. It held that the law of limitation acts in a draconian manner, requiring parties to approach the court within the prescribed time period.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petitions on the grounds of limitation.
JUDGMENT
1. In these batch of matters, the petitioners are before this Court seeking for setting aside the order passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge at Jamkhandi in various execution petitions all dtd. 17/3/2020 dismissing the execution petitions as being barred by time.
2. The petitioners in the various Civil Revision Petitions are the owners of certain extents of land which were acquired under a notification issued by the respondents for the purpose of implementing the Upper Krishna Project.
3. Initially award was passed on 10/10/1996 fixing the market value of the land at Rs.48,000.00 per acre. On a reference being made, the market value was fixed at Rs.3,39,700.00 per acre by the Reference Court. An appeal and cross appeal having been filed, the appeal by the State came to be dismissed and the cross-appeal filed by the land losers was partly allowed by enhancing the compensation to Rs.4,70,448.00 per acre vide order dtd. 18/1/2002.
4. The execution proceedings were filed on 14/3/2014. The Execution Court being of the opinion that the award came to be enforceable on 18/1/2002 and the period of limitation having expired on 19/1/2014, dismissed the execution proceedings which were filed on 14/3/2014 stating that there is a delay of one month and 26 days. It is aggrieved by the same that the petitioners are before this Court.
5. Sri.Mrutyunjaya Tata Bangai, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the execution proceedings could only be filed after the enhancement was made by this Court in a miscellaneous first appeal and as such the decree become enforceable only thereafter and the petitioners are required to be given due credit for the time taken in the disposal of the miscellaneous first appeal.
6. In this regard, he relies upon decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Posani Ramachandraiah vs. Daggupati Seshamma [AIR 1978 AP 342], more particularly para 10 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
10. When the Legislature enacted Art. 136 by omitting S. 48 C.P.C. and reproducing it Art. 136, we have to take it that they must have been aware of the interpretation of S.46 by the Courts and approved of it. Consequently, we hold that under Art. 136 of the present Limitation Act, the period of limitation can be reckoned from the date of the appellate decree, even though there was no stay in the appeal. If there is an appeal, the decree that can be enforced is that of the appellate court, and the period of limitation has to be reckoned form the date of that decree. In this case, the L.P.A. was dismissed on 30/10/1969. From that date the decree became enforceable. Therefore, E.P.No. 39/1973 filed on 23- 4-1973 within time, for it was filed within 12 years under Art. 136 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, we affirm the decision of Punnayya, J., and dismiss L.P.A. No. 4/1977.
7. Reliance is also placed on the decision reported in K.Muniswamappa vs. P.Chennakrishnappa [AIR 1971 Mys 266], more particularly para Nos.5, 6 and 19 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
5. The two points raised in the appeal before the Supreme Court were:
(1) The previous execution petition having been dismissed, it was not pending at the time of the filing of Ext. Petn. 13/39 and therefore the later application was ft fresh application under Sec. 48, Civil Procedure Code.
(2) Even if the previous application was "closed" for statistical purposes, and the decree-holders could apply for reviving those proceedings, Exn. Petn. 13/39 was a fresh execution because the properties proceeded against are different and the relief asked for was also different.
6. It was held that the passing of orders by the executing court using the expressions like "closed for statistical purposes", "struck off", "recorded" etc., cannot tantamount to an order of dismissal, for the intention of the court in making such an order is for statistical purposes, and that it was not intended to finally dispose of the application w
Bikoba Deora Gaikwad vs. Hirabai Marutirao Ghorgare
AI
The period of limitation for filing execution proceedings commences when the decree becomes enforceable, not based on any acknowledgment made by the judgment debtor or otherwise.
A second execution petition filed after the limitation period is barred, and withdrawal of an earlier execution does not extend the limitation period.
The limitation period for execution of a decree under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, begins from the date of the appellate court's final order dismissing the appeal, even if such dismissal ....
Execution of decree – Limitation period would commence only with decree becoming enforceable and is capable of being executed.
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