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2023 Supreme(SC) 905

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Sanjiv Khanna, M.M. Sundresh, JJ.
M/s Uss Alliance – Appellant
Versus
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. – Respondents
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 23676 of 2022 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 21-11-2022 in MUA 227 No. 4455 of 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench)
Decided On : 06-01-2023

Advocates Appeared:
Mr. Anurag Kishore, Advocate, Mr. Manish Mani Sharma, Advocate, Ms. Namni Bhutoria, Advocate, for the Appellant.

Once an arbitral award has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award which has to be challenged and not the original award.

Headnote:INTERPRETATION - ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 - Section 34(3), Section 33 - The court interpreted Section 34(3) with reference to Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It held that the disposal of an application under Section 33 would be the starting point for limitation. The court emphasized that once the arbitral award has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award which has to be challenged and not the original award.

Fact of the Case:

The case involved an interpretation of Sections 34(3) and 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in relation to a correction made by an arbitral tribunal in an award.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that objections filed within ninety days from the date of the corrected award were within the limitation period. It also noted that the Court has the power to condone delay for a further period of thirty days.

Issues:

Interpretation of Sections 34(3) and 33 in relation to correction made by an arbitral tribunal in an award; Limitation period for filing objections.

Ratio Decidendi:

The starting point for limitation in case of suo-moto correction of the award is the date on which the correction was made and the corrected award is received by the party.

Final Decision:

The special leave petition was dismissed as there were no good grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment.

ORDER

1. This Court in SLP (C) No. 20195/2017 titled 'M/S Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of India' decided on 08.08.2018 has interpreted Section 34 (3) with reference to Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [For short, 'Act'.], to hold that the disposal of an application under Section 33 of the Act would be the starting point for limitation. This decision was in the context of an application moved by one of the parties before the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. In the present case, the arbitral tribunal in terms of powers given under sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act had on its own initiative made corrections in the award dated 18.04.2018, vide the award dated 05.05.2018. The suo-moto corrections in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act can be made within a period of 30 days from the date of arbitral award.

2. In our opinion, looking at the purpose and object behind Section 34 (3) of the Act, which is to enable the parties to study, examine and understand the award, thereupon, if the party chooses and is advised, draft and file objections within the time specified, the starting point for the limitation in case of suo-moto correction of the award, would be the date on which the correction was made and the corrected award is received by the party. Once the arbitral award has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award which has to be challenged and not the original award. The original award stands modified, and the corrected award must be challenged by filing objections.

3. This interpretation would be in terms and accord with the reasoning which has been interpreted in the 'M/S Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of India' (supra).

4. In the present case, the objections/application for setting aside the arbitral award were filed on 03.08.2018, which is within a period of ninety days from the date of the corrected award. Hence, the High Court was right in holding that the objections were filed within the limitation period. Even otherwise, the Court has the power to condone the delay for further period of thirty days. Application for condonation of delay can be filed at anytime till the proceedings are pending. Of course, exercise of discretion and whether or not the delay should be condoned is a different matter.

5. In view of the aforesaid position, we do not find any good ground and reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and hence, the special leave petition is dismissed.

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