ORDER :

1. Leave granted.

2. The respondent although served with the notice issued by this Court yet has chosen not to remain present before this Court either in-person or through an advocate and oppose this appeal.

3. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 12.02.2021 in Appeal No. 67 of 2019 by which the appeal filed by the appellant herein under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the “1996 Act”) came to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant had not filed the arbitration petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act within the period of limitation prescribed therein.

4. Heard Ms. Sanjana Saddy, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant.

5. The learned counsel would submit that the impugned order is in direct conflict with the decision of this Court in the M/s. Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons vs. Union of India , (2018) SCC Online SC 3181. The counsel would argue that in Ved Prakash (supra) this Court held that the period of limitation for challenging an award would, in terms of Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, commence only from the date on which an application filed under Section 33 of the Act 1996 is disposed of.

6. She would further argue that High Court committed a serious error in holding that the application filed by the appellant herein did not fall within the parameters of Section 33 sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act.

7. She would also argue that the High Court committed an error in holding that the limitation period of three-months would commence from the date of receipt of the arbitration award and not the date of the order dismissing or disposing the application under Section 33 sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act, that was filed by the appellant herein.

8. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside and the matter be remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Section 34 application.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS AT PLAY

9. We must first look into the Section 34 of the Act 1996, more particularly sub-section (3) which reads thus:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award:

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

10. Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, prescribes the period of limitation within which an application for the setting aside of an arbitral award may be filed by a party aggrieved by the award so passed.

11. The 1996 Act being a special law, in view of Section 29 sub-section (2) of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 the special period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 sub-section (3) for making an application for setting aside the arbitral award as well as for condonati