Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J.—Heard Mr. Alok Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Manish Sahay, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent.

2. The present appeal has been preferred for setting aside the order dated 04.07.2024 passed by learned District Judge, Saran at Chapra (hereinafter ‘the learned court’) in Miscellaneous Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned order’).

3. By the impugned order, the learned court has been pleased to reject the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1996’ or ‘1996 Act’) challenging the part of the arbitral award dated 12.05.2022 and additional award dated 08.08.2022. The dismissal of the application is solely based on the ground of limitation.

4. The learned court took a view that as per Section 34 (3) of the Act of 1996, the maximum period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an award is three months, delay may be condoned only for a period of 30 days, but not thereafter. The learned court found that the arbitral award was passed on 12.05.2022 but the application for setting aside the award was filed on 05.11.2022 i.e. after more than 160 days of the passing of the award.

5. On perusal of the records, it is found that the plea of the appellant before the learned court that the appellant had filed an application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 on 01.08.2022 before the learned Arbitral Tribunal which came to be disposed of on 08.08.2022, therefore, the limitation may start running only from 08.08.2022, has been rejected by the learned court.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

6. Mr. Alok Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned order on the ground that the learned court could not appreciate the scheme of Sections 33 and 34 of the Act of 1996. According to him, in this case, the award was passed on 12.05.2022 but it was delivered on 24.05.2022, therefore, at first instance, the period of limitation of three months as prescribed under proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would start running from the date of delivery/receipt of the award and not from the date of passing of the award.

7. It is his further contention that after the arbitral award was received by the appellant, the appellant was advised to file an application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 for carrying out certain corrections. This application was filed on 01.08.2022 which came to be disposed of only on 08.08.2022. Referring to the provision of Section 33 of the Act of 1996, Mr. Agrawal, learned counsel would submit that the date of disposal of the application under Section 33 being 08.08.2022, the period of limitation may be reckoned with only with effect from the said date and not before that. If the limitation is counted from 08.08.2022, the application under Section 34 (1) of the Act of 1996 would come within the period of three months and in such circumstance, there would be no reason to dismiss the application on the ground of the same being barred by limitation. Learned counsel relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of North Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. S.A. Builders Ltd. reported in AIR 2024 SC (Supp) 486.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent

8. Mr. Manish Sahay, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent has put a strong contest to the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. It is submitted that a bare perusal of Section 33 of the Act of 1996 would show that there is a period of limitation fixed for filing of an application by a party before the learned Arbitral Tribunal requesting the Tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of similar nature occurring in the award. Sub-section (1) of Section 33 provides that such application should be filed within a period of 30 days from the receipt of