1. Conviction of a public servant for demanding and accepting a bribe under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. (Para 2 )
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2025 Supreme(SC) 796
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipankar Datta, Manmohan, JJ.
Dashrath – Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 2120 of 2025 [Arising Out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13997 of 2024]
Decided On : 24-04-2025
Important Points
Sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act requires only a prima facie satisfaction of the authority, and minor procedural omissions do not invalidate the proceedings if justice is not compromised.
Subject
Criminal Law - Corruption
Act Referred
BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA: S.218
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.142
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE: S.313, S.465
EVIDENCE ACT: S.56
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT: S.13, S.17, S.19, S.7
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.142
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE: S.313, S.465
EVIDENCE ACT: S.56
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT: S.13, S.17, S.19, S.7
Headnote
(A) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) - The High Court dismissed the appellant's conviction appeal, upholding the Special Court's ruling, which sentenced him to two years R.I. and a fine for accepting bribes - The requirement for sanctioning authority is to be satisfied about prima facie case, not the truth of the facts - Grant of sanction cannot be faulted if the authority exercised discretion without altering substance. (Paras 12, 14)
(B) Sanction to Prosecute - The purpose of requiring sanction is to protect innocent public servants from mala fide prosecution while ensuring that corruption is addressed - Mere procedural errors in sanction do not void proceedings if justice is not compromised. (Paras 10, 12)
Facts of the case:
The appellant was convicted under the PC Act for demanding and accepting a bribe, with the contention raised of mechanical sanction against him and impropriety in the investigation. The complainant's testimony substantiated the demand. (Paras 4, 19)
Findings of Court:
The court upheld the conviction and rulings of the lower courts, affirming evidence of the conviction, and found no merit in the appeal contending against procedural errors. (Paras 21, 30)
Issues: The main questions addressed were the adequacy of sanctioning authority's approval, validity of investigation conducted, and evidentiary support for demand of bribe. (Paras 4, 5)
Ratio Decidendi: The judgment emphasized that a minor procedural lapse does not annul sanction, and the evidentiary burden of proof for demands made was satisfied in this case. Article 142 powers cannot be exercised to reduce sentences below statutory minimum unless in rare cases where extraordinary circumstances arise. (Paras 24, 28)
Result: Appeal partly allowed, with modification of sentence.
(B) Sanction to Prosecute - The purpose of requiring sanction is to protect innocent public servants from mala fide prosecution while ensuring that corruption is addressed - Mere procedural errors in sanction do not void proceedings if justice is not compromised. (Paras 10, 12)
Facts of the case:
The appellant was convicted under the PC Act for demanding and accepting a bribe, with the contention raised of mechanical sanction against him and impropriety in the investigation. The complainant's testimony substantiated the demand. (Paras 4, 19)
Findings of Court:
The court upheld the conviction and rulings of the lower courts, affirming evidence of the conviction, and found no merit in the appeal contending against procedural errors. (Paras 21, 30)
Issues: The main questions addressed were the adequacy of sanctioning authority's approval, validity of investigation conducted, and evidentiary support for demand of bribe. (Paras 4, 5)
Ratio Decidendi: The judgment emphasized that a minor procedural lapse does not annul sanction, and the evidentiary burden of proof for demands made was satisfied in this case. Article 142 powers cannot be exercised to reduce sentences below statutory minimum unless in rare cases where extraordinary circumstances arise. (Paras 24, 28)
Result: Appeal partly allowed, with modification of sentence.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
- constitutional law
- practice and procedure
Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Pai Amit, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Pai Amit, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
Table of Contents
2. Challenges to sanction validity, investigating officer's competence, proof of demand, witness credibility, and request for sentence reduction based on age and time elapsed. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 )
3. Sanction requires prima facie satisfaction; statutory orders authorizing investigating officers are judicially noticeable; Article 142 cannot override statutory minimum sentences for corruption. (Para 11 , 14 , 18 , 28 , 30 )
4. Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to reduce a sentence below the minimum period prescribed by statute. (Para 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 )
5. Conviction affirmed; sentence under Section 7 reduced to one year simple imprisonment, while sentence under Section 13 is maintained, both running concurrently. (Para 33 , 35 )
6. Does the use of a draft order by a sanctioning authority render the sanction mechanical or invalid?
No. Grant of sanction is an administrative function based on subjective satisfaction of a prima facie case. If the authority is satisfied with the draft, the absence of changes does not prove a lack of application of mind or a failure of justice. (Para 11 , 14 )
7. Can a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent investigate offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act?
Yes, if the State Government has issued a general order under the first proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act authorizing such officers. Such orders have the force of law and are judicially noticeable under the Evidence Act. (Para 16 , 17 , 18 )
8. Can the Supreme Court use Article 142 to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum?
No. Where a minimum sentence is prescribed by statute, Article 142 cannot be used to reduce it, as doing so would amount to supplanting the statutory mandate and usurping the function of the legislature. (Para 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 )
9. Does a relationship between a seizure witness and the complainant automatically vitiate a conviction?
No. The evidence of a related witness need not be discarded if it is found creditworthy and the version provided in chief is not shaken during thorough cross-examination. (Para 20 )
JUDGMENT :
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The judgment and order dated 3rd September, 20241[impugned order] of a learned Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, is under challenge in this criminal appeal. By the impugned order, the learned Judge dismissed a criminal appeal2[Crl. Appeal No. 303 of 2004] carried by the appellant from the judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 26th April, 2004 of the Special Judge, Parbhani3[Special Court] in Special Case No.05/2000. Upon maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19884[PC Act], the learned Judge also upheld the punishment of R.I. of two years and fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 7 , and R.I. of a year and fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 13 , with default stipulation, imposed on the appellant.
3. The facts giving rise to the incident of the offence, the trap proceedings and other factual details have been noted in details by the Special Court as well as by the High Court. We do not consider it necessary to repeat the same here.
4. The conviction of the appellant as well as the sentence imposed on him are questioned by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel for the appellant, by raising the following legal contentions:
i. sanction to prosecute was mechanically granted;
ii. investigation was conducted by an Inspector of Police (PW-4), although in terms of the statutory mandate contained in Section 17 of the PC Act, no officer lower in rank than a Deputy Superintendent of Police can investigate the crime;
iii. the demand was not proved and the conviction is indefensible having regard to the law declared by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; and
iv. one of the seizure witnesses was related to the complainant.
5. Ms. Arora, in the alternative, submitted that the incident being more than 25 years old and the appellant by passage of time having become a septuagenarian, the Court may consider altering the sentence, if it were not inclined to disturb the conviction, so that at this age the appellant is not made to suffer any imprisonment.
6. In support of her contention, Ms. Arora referred to an order dated 23rd January, 2025 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in H.P. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No.1466 of 2017 in a case also arising out of a conviction under the PC Act. There, taking into consideration the facts that the appellant was a sexagenarian, that the occurrence took place in 2007 and that he had also been dismissed from service, the coordinate Bench in the peculiar circumstances of the case and in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, modified the sentence to 15 days imprisonment. She prayed for similar indulgence.
7. Per contra, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel for the respondent-State, contended that the findings returned by the Special Court and the High Court are based on the evidence led in the trial and having regard to the answers given by the appellant to the questions in course of his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19737[Cr. PC], there could be little doubt that he had demanded and accepted bribe and, therefore, was guilty of the charges. She also submitted that the appellant had not spent a single night in custody and in light of the fact that maximum sentence permitted by law was not imposed, no interference is called for with the discretion exercised by the Special Court. She, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
8. We have heard Ms. Arora and Ms. Bobde and perused the materials on record as well as a relevant ‘ORDER’ of the Government of Maharashtra, referred to in the judgment of the Special Court, on which we have been able to lay our hands through the search processes that are now available.
9. In developing the first c
