SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Sanjay Karol, Manoj Misra, JJ.
Rajesh Sharma – Appellant
Versus
North Delhi Municipal Corporation And Anr. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 8640 of 2026 (SLP (C) No. 28644 of 2019)
Decided On : 17-06-2026
(A) Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 – Regulations 6 and 7 – Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 – Section 59 – Dismissal from service – Consequent to substitution of clause (d) of Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993, with effect from 01.10.1993, notwithstanding existing 1959 Regulations, it is Commissioner who is disciplinary authority of appellant and as such competent to impose punishment of dismissal from service – Impugned judgment of High Court upheld. (Paras 77, 82, 83 and 84)
(B) Interpretation of Statute – Principles of Construction – Use of word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ in amending Act is not necessarily reflection of two severable steps, one of repeal and other of insertion – It may be a single indivisible step of making existing provision inoperative by replacing it with new provision – Court must look at legislative intent -whether it is to repeal existing provision independent to insertion of new one – If legislative intent is composite and indivisible, to remove and insert simultaneously, judicial approach of segregating these two steps and treating them differently would amount to re-writing law contrary to legislative intent – Mere use of word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ in amending Act does not make substituted provision relate back to date of enforcement of provision which it seeks to substitute – Unless legislative intent is to the contrary, inserted provision brought by way of substitution is to operate from date it is placed in the statute – Construction of amended provision is governed by legislative intent and not nomenclature put to amendment – While construing amended provision, if words employed so permit, an interpretation which serves purpose of amendment must be preferred – Task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover intention of Legislature from language used. (Paras 44 and 65)
(C) Interpretation of Statute – Principle of Prospectivity – Every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation – Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, it is open for Legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation – This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from language employed – If it is a necessary implication from language employed that legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, courts will give it such an operation – When retrospective operation is not expressly given, courts may be called upon to construe provisions and answer question whether legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention to give retrospectivity to statute or its provision. (Para 46)
(D) Interpretation of Statute – Rule of Harmonious Construction – When there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both – Construction that reduces one of provisions to a ‘useless lumber’ or ‘dead letter’ is not harmonious construction – To harmonize is not to destroy – If a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from general provision [Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, and Generalibus Specialia Derogant] – If two sections of an Act cannot be reconciled, as they may be absolute contradictions, last must prevail – But this should be accepted only in last resort. (Para 79)
(E) Statute Law – Subordinate Legislation – Regulations are piece of subordinate legislation – What can be achieved by a subordinate legislation under the Act can always be achieved by an amendment of the Act by competent legislature – Existence of a Regulation framed under the Act cannot fetter legislative power to amend the Act in a way that it overrides the Regulation. (Para 80)
Facts of the case:
The short question that arises for consideration is whether Commissioner was competent to inflict punishment of dismissal from service upon the appellant.
Findings of Court:
Parliament by substituting clause (d) of Section 59 has specified Disciplinary Authority subject to any regulation that may be made thereafter. Therefore, Section 59(d), as substituted, and Section 95(1) have been crafted to operate in different fields. Section 59(d) provides as to who would be disciplinary authority subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf whereas Section 95 (1) specifies punishments that can be imposed on a Municipal Officer or other Municipal Employees by such authority as may be prescribed by Regulations.
Result : Appeal dismissed.
Key Points: - The Commissioner is the disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and other municipal employees, subject to the relevant amendments and regulatory framework. (!) (!) (!) - The substitution of clause (d) of Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993 came into force on 01.10.1993 and did not have retrospective effect. (!) (!) - The phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" refers to regulations that may be made after substitution, not the existing pre-substitution regulations. (!) (!) - Regulations can be overridden by statutory amendments; there is a harmonious construction between amended statutory provisions and regulations. (!) (!) - The High Court’s interpretation was overruled; the Commissioner was the competent disciplinary authority at the time of dismissal. (!) (!)
JUDGMENT
MANOJ MISRA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order of the High Court1 [High Court of Delhi at New Delhi] dated 28.08.2019 in Writ Petition (C) No.3451/2015, whereby the writ petition of the respondents against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi2 [CAT] dated 07.08.2014 in Original Application (for short, O.A.) No.4466/2011 was allowed.
FACTS
3. The appellant served as an Executive Engineer (Civil) with the North Delhi Municipal Corporation (for short, the Corporation). While in service he was convicted and sentenced under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19883 [P.C. Act] and Sections 420, 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code, 18604 [IPC] vide order dated 15.07.2011. Pursuant to his conviction, the Commissioner dismissed him from service vide order dated 15.11.2011. Impugning the order of dismissal, the appellant filed O.A. No.4466/2011 before CAT, inter alia, on the ground that on the date the order of dismissal was passed he was a Group A officer and, therefore, the authority competent to take disciplinary action against him was the ‘Corporation’ and not the Commissioner. CAT accepted the aforesaid plea and set aside the dismissal vide order dated 07.08.2014 by leaving it open for the competent disciplinary authority to pass a fresh penalty order. Aggrieved therewith, the respondents preferred writ petition before the High Court which came to be allowed by the impugned order. The High Court held that Commissioner being the Disciplinary Authority was empowered to dismiss the respondent i.e., the appellant herein.
4. The short question that arises for our consideration is whether the Commissioner was competent to inflict the punishment of dismissal from service upon the appellant.
5. To have a clear understanding of the context in which the issue arises for our consideration, it is necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory provisions as well as the regulations prevailing on the date of the order of dismissal.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
6. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 19575 [The 1957, Act] (Act No.66 of 1957) was an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the Municipal Government of Delhi. Section 2 (7) of the 1957 Act defines “Corporation” as follows:
7. Section 3 of the 1957 Act provided for establishment of a Municipal Corporation of Delhi charged with the Municipal Government of Delhi. According to Section 3, as it stood then, ‘with effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint, there shall be a Corporation charged with the Municipal Government of Delhi, to be known as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi’. It further provided that “Corporation” shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire, hold or dispose of property and may by the said name sue and be sued. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provided that the Corporation shall be composed of the councilors and alderman. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 provided that ‘councilors’ shall be chosen by direct election on the basis of adult suffrage from various wards into which Delhi shall be divided in accordance with the Act; and alderman shall be chosen by the councilors from among persons who are qualified to be councilors but are not councilors themselves. Sub-section (5) provided that the total number of councilors shall at the establishment of the Corporation be 80, provided that 12 out of 80 seats of councilors shall be reserved for the members of the scheduled castes.
8. Chapter III of the 1957 Act delineates functions of the Corporation. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 provided that “subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations and bye laws made thereunder the Municipal Government of Delhi shall vest in the Corporation.”
9. Sec
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