The word 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bonafides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the concerned parties.

JUDGMENT

Ninala Jayasurya, J. - The present Revision Petition is preferred against an Order passed in I.A. No. 210 of 2019 in A.S. No. 17 of 2016 dated 01.12.2021 on the file of the Court of the Judge, Family Court-cum-V Additional District Judge, Tirupati.

2. Heard Mr. N. Ranga Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Srinivas Basava, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3.

3. The petitioner herein is respondent No. 1 in the above referred I.A. The respondents herein filed the said I.A., under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (for short 'the Act') and Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'C.P.C.'), seeking to condone the delay of 430 days in presenting the application for setting aside abatement of the appeal against the 5th appellant which occurred due to non-impleadment of the legal heirs of deceased-5th appellant. The petitioner/1st respondent filed her counter opposing the said application. The learned Appellate Court after considering the matter condoned the delay and allowed the petition on payment of costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the petitioner herein. Aggrieved by the said Orders, the present Revision Petition came to be field.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Order of the learned Appellate Court in condoning the huge delay of 430 days is perverse and liable to be set aside. He submits that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein were negligent and deliberately protracting the proceedings on one pretext or the other and application seeking to condone the delay is lacking in bona fides. He further submits that in the absence of proper explanation for each day's delay, the same cannot be condoned, in a causal manner. He submits that the reasons as assigned by the respondents, would not satisfy the requirements of sufficient cause or justify the condonation of delay. He further submits that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate the matter in a correct perspective and as a result of condoning the huge delay of 430 days, the rights and interest of the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced.

5. The learned counsel placing reliance on the decisions in Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd., v. Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai and Others 2022 (1) ALT 533 (D.B.) (T.S.) and Jampala Poornanada Venkateswara Prasad v. Roshini Chit Funds and Finance Private Limited and Others 2021(1) ALT 650 (D.B.) (A.P.) submits that the Order under Revision is liable to be set aside.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 supported the Order under Challenge, inter alia, contending that the learned Appellate Court after due consideration of the matter and by relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was inclined to condone the delay of 430 days by recording cogent reasons. He submits that under the said circumstances, no interference is called for unless this Court comes to a conclusion that the Order under Revision is perverse or suffers from material irregularities, which are not present in the case on hand. He further submits that the application filed by the respondents herein is to condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside the abatement of appeal and in such cases, it is settled law that the delay in making such applications shall be dealt with more leniently than the applications seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals. In any case, the learned counsel submits that as opined by the appellate Court, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner, if the delay in filing the application to set aside the abatement of appeal is condoned. The learned counsel, making the said submissions, seeks dismissal of the Revision Petition.

7. This Court had considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the material and also gone through the decisions, on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

8. At the outset, it may be noted and as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the